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THE ILC AND THE RECONSTRUCTION OF
U.S. BANKING
Mehrsa Baradaran*
1. INTRODUCTIONIN the fall of 2008, the United States experienced an unprecedented
financial collapse that has dramatically affected global financial mar-
kets and called into question banking practices and regulations previ-
ously thought to be sound. Politicians and economists have cobbled
together remedies to restore confidence in a banking system and regula-
tory framework that have not been updated since the Great Depression.
As the nature of banks, banking, and finance have changed drastically in
the last several decades, appropriate and effective remedies to the current
financial crisis are difficult without revisions to outdated theories and reg-
ulations governing the financial system. One such theory is that banking
and commerce should not mix.1 This theory was born after the Great
Depression because of fears of conglomeration and abuse and enforced
through several decades of regulation. 2 However, the conglomerated na-
ture of banking today renders these fears moot.
Though the financial systems of several other countries have benefited
from mixing banking and commerce, 3 the United States has minimally
tested this principle in just one area-the Industrial Loan Company
(ILC) banking charter. The ILC, which is the only banking charter that a
commercial firm can operate and is authorized by only a few states, came
under intense scrutiny in 2005 when Wal-Mart applied for an ILC charter
* Assistant Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young Univer-
sity. The author thanks Randall Guynn, George Sutton, Gordon Smith, Troy McKenzie,
Daniel Matthews, Brad Lowe, and the Academic Fellows at the New York University
School of Law. Special thanks to Jared Bybee.
1. Throughout this article, I will use the term "banking" to mean a commercial bank
that accepts deposits and makes loans-the traditional definition of bank. Investment
banking differs from traditional banking due to activities such as securities underwriting
and brokerage arms. The term "commerce" refers to non-financial firms, such as retail or
industrial firms whose primary business is not financial. The "mixing of banking and com-
merce" is when banking and commercial firms are affiliated, have common ownership, or
when either commercial firms conduct banking activities or vice versa. This article will
deal primarily with bank ownership structure and not with the types of activities that can
be conducted within a bank. For a review of the debate about the mixing of commerce and
banking, see Thomas F. Huertas, Can Banking and Commerce Mix?, 7 CATO J. 743, 743-62
(1988).
2. See infra Part III.B.2 and accompanying notes.
3. See Joseph G. Haubrich & Joio A.C. Santos, Alternative Forms of Mixing Banking
with Commerce: Evidence from American History, 12 FIN. MARKETS, INSTITUTIONS & IN-
STRUMENTS 121, 123 & 159-60 (2003).
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and attempted to enter the banking industry.4 The commotion surround-
ing the ILC died down shortly after Wal-Mart withdrew its application in
2007, but skepticism of its value and soundness continues to remain high
among some lawmakers and regulators.5 However, as the recent financial
crisis has caused many U.S. banks to falter or fail, ILCs have remained
sound mainly due to their stable commercial alliances.6 In over two de-
cades of operation, no commercially owned ILC has caused any loss to
the FDIC fund, largely as a result of efficient regulation and its reliance
on parent commercial firms.7 As the traditional banking framework fal-
ters, the resilient structure and success of the ILC, once a banking out-
cast, should serve as a prototype of an emerging banking model and a
provider of much needed stability.
The ILC structure has been both maligned and ignored by policymak-
ers, and treated as a deviant and problematic banking structure. Re-
cently, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act (the Dodd-Frank bill) issued a moratorium on new charters and cast
doubt on their continued existence.8 The ILC structure and its ramifica-
tions to the modern state of banking have not been adequately studied in
academic or public discourse. It is especially important to examine the
ILC in the aftermath of a banking collapse that has crippled the nation.
Part II of this paper documents the background of ILCs and the cur-
rent debate on ILCs, beginning with Wal-Mart's infamous application in
2005, Congress's attempts to suspend ILCs in 2007, and the current bank-
ing proposals addressing the ILC charter. Part III sets forth the argu-
ments waged against the ILC and challenges the idea that a separation of
commerce and banking is necessary for financial stability. Part IV identi-
fies the utility and strength of the ILC and the broader economic advan-
tages of mixing commerce and banking.
II. INDUSTRIAL LOAN COMPANIES
Industrial loan companies and industrial banks are FDIC-insured,
state-chartered banks that are unique among banks in that commercial
firms can own them.9 ILCs are similar to commercial banks in the activi-
ties they are able to conduct, their management, and their regulatory
structure.10 Under current law, a commercial company, such as Wal-Mart
4. See infra Part II.C and accompanying notes.
5. See Cheyenne Hopkins & Joe Adler, Thrift Charter and ILC Option Won't Go
Down Without a Fight, AM. BANKER, June 17, 2009, at 1.
6. See infra notes 288-93 and accompanying text.
7. See infra note 264 and accompanying text.
8. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1815).
9. See Mindy West, The FDIC's Supervision of Industrial Loan Companies: A Histor-
ical Perspective, SUPERVISORY INSIGHTs, Summer 2004, at 5, available at http://
www.fdic.gov/regulations/examinations/supervisory/insights/sisum04/sisum04.pdf.
10. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-621, INDUSTRIAL LOAN CORPO-
RATIONs: RECENT ASSET GROWTH AND COMMERCIAL INTEREST HIGHLIGHT DIFFER-
ENCES IN REGULATORY AUTHORITY (2005) [hereinafter GAO REPORT].
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or Ford Motor Company (Ford), cannot own a retail bank." With an
ILC charter, however, a commercial company can own an "industrial
bank,"12 which in practice has most of the powers of retail banks, includ-
ing deposit-taking and lending. Industrial banks are chartered under an
exception to the federal Bank Holding Company Act (BHC Act), which
allows commercial companies to own industrial banks without the restric-
tions that generally apply to Bank Holding Companies (BHCs). This ex-
ception also allows these commercial companies to own these banks
without being subject to federal consolidated bank supervision. 13
Only seven states have chartered industrial banks in the past: Utah,
Nevada, California, Hawaii, Colorado, Minnesota, and Indiana.14 How-
ever, most of these no longer permit the chartering of ILCs or do not
have a system in place to regulate them.15 Utah has become the home of
ILCs and has chartered and regulated virtually all ILCs established in the
last two decades.16 ILCs are state-chartered banks and "state nonmem-
ber banks," and their primary federal banking supervisor is the FDIC,
pursuant to the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (FDI Act).17 The FDIC
regulates ILCs with the same authority and procedure it uses to supervise
other banks.18
Ironically, opposition to the ILC stemmed from its popularity rather
than from any inherent problem in the industry.19 At their inception,
11. The Bank Holding Company Act states that a company that controls a bank must
not engage in non-banking activities. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(a) (2006).
12. Utah law was amended in 2004 and now refers to ILCs as industrial banks. UTAH
CODE ANN. § 7-8-21 (West 2009). This article will refer to this entity as the "ILC" as the
term is more widely used among legislators and commentators.
13. See Industrial Bank Subsidiaries of Financial Companies, 72 Fed. Reg. 5217, 5227
(Feb. 5, 2007) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 354) (notice). By using the term "Federal
Consolidated Bank Supervision," I refer to the supervision provided by either the Federal
Reserve Board or the Office of Thrift Supervision. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLB)
of 1999 gives the Federal Reserve supervision over BHCs and Financial Holding Compa-
nies (FHC's). Pub. L. No. 106-102, tit. I, 113 Stat. 1338, 1370 (1999). A firm that is a
holding company for a non-BHC Act bank is not a BHC and is not subject to Federal
Consolidated Bank Supervision. 12 U.S.C. § 1813(a)(2) (2006).
14. See Industrial Loan Companies: A Review of Charter, Ownership, and Supervision
Issues Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 109th Cong. 19 (2006) (statement of Douglas H.
Jones, Acting General Counsel, FDIC) [hereinafter Jones Statement]; H.R. REP. No. 110-
155, at 9 (2007).
15. Industrial Bank Subsidiaries of Financial Companies, 72 Fed. Reg. at 522 n.33; see
also H.R. REP. No. 110-155, supra note 14, at 10. See generally GAO REPORT, supra note
10.
16. George Sutton, Industrial Banks, 56 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 178, 179 (2002); see
GAO REPORT, supra note 10, at 16.
17. West, supra note 9, at 5.
18. Jones Statement, supra note 14, at 9.
19. In his address to Congress as they were deliberating the suspension of the ILC
charter, Utah Commissioner Edward Leary stated:
I believe that I am here today because of the success of th[e] regulatory
model, not its failure. . . . I am told the articulated threat which warrants
passage of this bill is a potential threat of misuse of the charter by holding
companies which are non-financially oriented. This bill seeks to remove a
potential threat even before the threat materialized or manifests itself.
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industrial banks focused on small consumer loans in local markets. 20 To-
day, many large international companies control industrial banks and use
them to support their complex business transactions and financial opera-
tions.21 In the last decade, ILCs experienced an exponential growth of
assets and deposits held.2 2 Proponents of the ILC feel that the expansion
of the ILC model is indicative of its success and of the market need for
such entities.23 Opponents of the charter, a group that emerged to op-
pose Wal-Mart's proposed ILC a few years ago, 24 claim that the mixing of
banking and commerce, uniquely allowed through the ILC charter, in-
creases systemic risk to the financial system 25 and can lead to harmful
concentrations of power. 26 In Part III, I will address each of these argu-
ments and several others, and I will propose that they are largely without
merit and are not supported by history or empirical studies. In Part IV, I
discuss the advantages of mixing banking and commerce and demonstrate
that the ILC should not be suspended, but rather used as a model to
shape future banking regulation.
A. HISTORY OF ILC FORMATION
Historically, ILCs were state-chartered banks organized to give loans
to industrial workers who were not being served by other creditors. 27 Ar-
thur Morris established the first ILC in 1910, and it operated much like a
finance company. 28 These early ILCs were not permitted by law to ac-
cept "deposits" but, instead, could issue something similar to a deposit
called a "thrift certificate" to avoid the term.29 A crucial difference was
that these thrift certificates were not eligible for FDIC deposit
insurance.30
The Industrial Bank Holding Company Act of 2007: Hearing on H. R. 698 Before the H.
Comm. on Financial Servs., 110th Cong. 17 (2007) (testimony of G. Edward Leary, Utah
Comm'r of Fin. Institutions) [hereinafter Leary Testimony].
20. Christian Johnson & George G. Kaufman, A Bank By Any Other Name..., 31
EcoN. PERSP. (Fed Res. of Bank of Chi., Chi., Ill.), Fourth Quarter 2007, at 37, 41 available
at http://www.chicagofed.org/digital-assets/publications/economic-perspectives/2007/ep-
4qtr2007_part3johnson.etal.pdf.
21. See id. at 42; GAO REPORT, supra note 10, at 16.
22. See GAO REPORT, supra note 10, at 16.
23. See generally ILCs-A Review of Charter, Ownership, and Supervision Issues:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Institutions and Consumer Credit of the H. Comm.
on Fin. Servs., 109th Cong. 51-52 (2006) (testimony of George Sutton on behalf of the
Securities Industry Association) [hereinafter Sutton Testimony].
24. See H. COMM. ON FIN. SERVS., AT ISSUE: RETAILERS PURCHASING INDUSTRIAL
LOAN COMPANIES (ILCs) (May 2, 2007), available at http://financialservices.house.gov/
RetailersInBanking.html.
25. See GAO REPORT, supra note 10, at 29-30; Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Wal-Mart and
the Separation of Banking and Commerce, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1539, 1588 (2007)
26. See Letter from Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the Bd. of Governors of the Fed.
Res. Sys., to Tim Johnson, U.S. Sen. (June 25, 2003), 2003 Fed. Res. Super. Ltrs. LEXIS 17;
see also GAO REPORT, supra note 10, at 18-21. See generally Wilmarth, supra note 25.
27. See West, supra note 9, at 8.
28. See id. at 7.
29. Id. at 8.
30. See id.
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In 1982, the ILC industry changed dramatically when the Garn-St.
Germain Depository Institutions Act (Garn-St. Germain Act) formally
acknowledged thrift certificates and made them eligible for federal de-
posit insurance.31 Some states, including Utah and California, responded
by requiring ILCs to obtain FDIC insurance in order to keep their char-
ters.32 As a condition to receiving FDIC insurance, many ILCs were re-
quired to increase credit quality and meet other measures of general bank
soundness.33 After ILCs received FDIC insurance, demand for the char-
ter increased. 34
In the mid-1980s, ILCs and other "non-bank" charters, which func-
tioned as banks but were not subject to the BHC Act, became popular3 5
because they allowed their parent corporations to engage in "non-bank-
ing" activities. 36 Congress responded in 1987 with the Competitive
Equality Banking Act (CEBA), which brought many of these non-banks
under the umbrella of the BHC Act.3 7 CEBA declared that all banks
insured by the FDIC were "banks" and thus subject to the BHC Act and
all of its activity restrictions,38 which forced them to cease any non-bank-
ing activity.3 9 However, CEBA provided a specific exception for ILCs,
making ILCs one of the only non-bank alternatives available for commer-
cial firms.40 Thus, pursuant to CEBA, an ILC is not a "bank" for pur-
poses of the BHC Act if it meets one of the following conditions: (1) the
institution "does not accept demand deposits," (2) the institution's total
assets are less than $100,000,000, or (3) no company has acquired control
of the institution after August 10, 1987.41
It was CEBA's ILC exception that caused the boom in the ILC indus-
try because CEBA made the ILC the only available banking option for
commercial firms. 42 The first application for a commercially owned ILC
31. Id. at 8; see Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-
320, 96 Stat. 1469.
32. See West, supra note 9, at 8.
33. See id.
34. See id. at 9.
35. Id. According to the definition of "bank" under the BHC Act, a bank had to both
make loans and accept deposits. By only engaging in one of these tasks, an entity could fall
outside the BHC Act's definition and therefore avoid being subject to the Act. These
entities became known as "non-bank banks" and were still eligible for FDIC insurance. Id.
at 9 n.10.
36. Id. at 9.
37. See id.; Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-86, § 101, 101
Stat. 552, 554 (defining banks as institutions insured by the FDIC or that accept demand
deposits and make commercial loans).
38. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(A) (2006) (defining "bank" under the BHC Act); 12 U.S.C.
§ 1813(h) (2006) (defining "insured bank").
39. The BHC Act states that a company controls another if it (1) has direct or indirect
ownership, control, or power to vote 25% or more of any class of voting securities of that
company; (2) is able in any manner to elect a majority of the directors of that company; or
(3) is able to exercise, directly or indirectly, a controlling influence over that company as
determined by the Board. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(2).
40. Id. § 1841(c)(2)(H).
41. Id. § 1813(a)(2).
42. See West, supra note 9, at 9. See generally 0. Emre Ergungor & James B. Thom-
son, Industrial Loan Companies, ECON. COMMENT. (Federal Bank of Cleveland, Cleve-
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was filed with the FDIC in 1988, and many others followed.4 3 The indus-
try grew rapidly and without controversy until Wal-Mart applied for an
ILC charter. 4 4 In response to Wal-Mart's application, the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) expressed concerns about industrial
banks45 and questioned, among other things, whether the FDIC's super-
visory authority was sufficient to protect industrial banks. 4 6 However,
the extensive GAO report did not reveal any inherent risks in the ILC
industry. 47 Lawrence J. White, an NYU professor and former member of
the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB), stated in his prepared
testimony for Congressional hearings on July 12, 2006, that "[i]t is surely
no secret that the event that has drawn such extensive public attention to
the existence of ILC charters has been Wal-Mart's application to obtain a
Utah ILC charter and FDIC deposit insurance for its ILC."4 8 He re-
ferred to Wal-Mart's application as the "900 pound gorilla in the room."49
Notably, Target, Nordstrom, and many other large commercial firms ob-
tained federal deposit insurance without any controversy prior to Wal-
Mart's application.5 0
B. THE GROWTH OF THE ILC
The ILC industry experienced dramatic growth for two decades. 5 1 Be-
tween 1987 and 2007, industrial bank total assets grew from $4.2 billion to
over $243 billion.52 The growth resulted largely from non-BHC financial
firms opening ILCs to serve their banking needs and several commercial
firms using ILCs to service their various consumer needs.53 By far, Utah
saw the largest increase in ILC assets during this period and increased its
land, Ohio), Oct. 1, 2006, available at http://www.clevelandfed.org/research/Commentary/
2006/1001.pdf.
43. See West, supra note 9, at 9.
44. See Alexander Raskovich, Should Banking Be Kept Separate from Commerce 1
(U.S. Dep't of Justice, Econ. Analysis Grp., EAG 08-8, 2008), http://www.justice.gov/atr/
public/eag/236665.pdf.
45. See generally GAO REPORT, supra note 10.
46. See id. at 21.
47. See GAO REPORT, supra note 10, at 9-10.
48. ILCs-A Review of Charter, Ownership, and Supervision Issues: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Fin. Institutions and Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs.,
109th Cong. 218 (2006) (testimony of Lawrence J. White) [hereinafter White Testimony].
49. Id.
50. Liz Pulliam Weston, National Bank of Wal-Mart?, MSN MONEY, http://moneycen-
tral.msn.com/content/Banking/Betterbanking/Pl09l7l.asp (last visited Aug. 2, 2010).
51. Industrial Bank Holding Company Act of 2007: Hearing on H.R. 698 Before the H.
Comm. on Fin. Servs.,110th Cong. 126 (2007) (statement of Donald L. Kohn, Vice Chair-
man, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys.) [hereinafter Kohn Testimony]; see also GAO
REPORT, supra note 10, at 16.
52. See Industrial Bank Subsidiaries of Financial Companies, 72 Fed. Reg. 5217, 5218
(Feb. 5, 2007) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 354) (notice); John Daley, Utah's industrial
banks appear "Safe and Sound," KSL (Sep. 16, 2008, 5:00 PM), http://www.ksl.com/
?nid=1488sid=4280214.
53. Of the twenty-seven ILCs operating in Utah today, eight are considered to have a
commercial parent company. See G. Edward Leary, Utah Comm'r of Fin. Institutions,
Remarks before Utah Ass'n of Fin. Servs. 3 (Aug. 25, 2006) (transcript available at http://
www.dfi.utah.gov/PDFiles/IB%2OSpeech%202006.pdf) [hereinafter Leary Remarks].
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market share of ILC assets from 11% to 82%.54
Many ILC opponents expressed concern about this dramatic growth
because they perceived the ILC industry to be growing at a threatening
rate.55 However, at its height, the entire ILC industry was only about
1.5% of the banking industry. 56 The growth of the ILC, however, was
and is indicative of its increased popularity for large commercial and fi-
nancial firms.57 ILCs were growing because they provided the only way
for their commercial parents to participate in certain financing activities
that they viewed as cost-effective and complimentary to the marketing of
their other products.58
However, that growth has been halted by the recent financial crisis,
which has caused many investment banks and credit card companies to
seek BHC status and convert their ILCs into state-chartered banks. 59
This change has caused a contraction in the ILC sector, which has shrunk
from a high of $243 billion in assets in June 2008 to $104 billion in Sep-
tember 2009.60 The continued growth of ILCs is uncertain, as their future
depends on whether and how policymakers decide to change the indus-
try.61 Most of the large investment banks that formerly dominated the
ILC world applied for BHC status to gain access to Troubled Asset Relief
Program (TARP) funds and the Federal Reserve's discount window, but
also, and perhaps more importantly, to increase investor confidence.62
54. See GAO REPORT, supra note 10, at 19-20. Most ILCs have been established in
Utah because the state is perceived as "business-friendly" to ILCs and Utah's usury laws
are more desirable for the ILC business. Id. at 16, 19.
55. See GAO REPORT, supra note 10, at 16.
56. Leary Remarks, supra note 53, at 2; see ILCs-A Review of Charter, Ownership,
and Supervision Issues: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Institutions and Consumer
Credit of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 109th Cong. 22 (2006) (testimony of G. Edward
Leary, Utah Comm'r of Fin. Institutions), available at http://financialservices.house.gov/
media/pdf/071206gel.pdf; see also FED. RES. BD., REP. ON THE CONDITION OF THE U.S.
BANKING INDUSTRY: THIRD QUARTER, 2005 (2006), available at http://www.federalreserve.
gov/pubs/bulletin/2006/bankcondition/default.htm.
57. Kenneth Spong & Eric Robbins, Industrial Loan Companies: A Growing Industry
Sparks a Public Policy Debate, ECON. REv. (Federal Bank of Kansas City, Kansas City,
Missouri), Fourth Quarter 2007, at 41, 43, http://www.kansascityfed.org/PUBLICAT/
ECONREV/PDF/4q07Spong.pdf.
58. Id.
59. Andrew Ross Sorkin & Vikas Bajaj, Shift for Goldman and Morgan Marks the
End of an Era, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2008, at Al. In order to comply with the BHC, many
of these firms will convert their ILCs into state-chartered banks. GMAC has already con-
verted its ILC to a Utah-chartered state bank. Press Release, GMAC Fin. Servs., GMAC
Financial Services Bank Holding Company Application Approved by Federal Reserve
(Dec. 24, 2008), available at http://media.gmccfs.com/index.php?s=43&item=298. Goldman
Sachs has converted its ILC into a New York state-chartered bank. Goldman Sachs Gets
N.Y. Banking License, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 28, 2008, at B2; Jeff Bater, Fed Waives 5-Day
Waiting Period on Goldman, Morgan Stanley, REAL TIME EcoNoMics (Sept. 22, 2008,
12:02 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2008/09/22/fed-waives-5-day-waiting-period-on-
goldman-morgan-stanley/.
60. E-mail from Darryle Rude, Supervisor of Industrial Banks for the State of Utah,
to author (Dec. 2, 2009, 15:20 MST) (on file with the SMU Law Review).
61. Jonathan Stempel, Obama regulatory plan hits industrial loan cos, REUTERS (June
19, 2009, 8:07 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN1943466520090619.
62. See generally Sorkin & Bajaj, supra note 59. At least one firm that has exper-
ienced success in owning an ILC reportedly converted to a BHC in order to participate
2010] 1149
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These firms include financial giants, such as Goldman Sachs, Morgan
Stanley, American Express, GMAC, and CIT, among others.63 Because
these large investment banks participate in some "commercial activities,"
such as merchant banking, these banks were not regulated by the Federal
Reserve, were not considered BHCs, and could not own or operate
banks. 64 However, these investment banks are basically "shadow banks,"
engaged in financial activity with similar risks and liabilities as traditional
banks but with added risk due to their highly leveraged business model.65
By becoming BHCs, the firms are agreeing to increased federal oversight
and activity restrictions, such as higher capital reserves and lower risk
profiles.66
The new wave of conversions of investment banks to BHCs has focused
the ILC debate on commercial firm ownership of ILCs and highlights the
need for clearer regulation addressing the separation of banking and
commerce.67 This article focuses primarily on commercial firm owner-
ship of ILCs and not on investment banking for several reasons. First, as
mentioned, most investment banks that owned ILCs have now become
BHCs and are no longer dominant players in the ILC field. 68 Second, as
the massive conversion of investment banks to BHCs demonstrates, there
more fully in banking. Robert Barba, For This REIT, Bank Status Is Worth the Tax, AM.
BANKER, Jan. 2, 2009, at 1.
63. See generally Sorkin & Bajaj, supra note 59; Press Release, GMAC Fin. Servs.,
supra note 59.
64. In 1999, the GLB Act allowed investment banks, for the first time since the Great
Depression, to engage in commercial activities and "merchant banking" endeavors. See
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 122, 113 Stat. 1338, 1381 (1999); SEN.
COMM. ON BANKING, FINANCE, AND URBAN AFFAIRS, FIN. SERVS. MODERNIZATION Acr,
GRAMM-LEACH-BLILEY, SUMMARY OF PROVISIONS, http://banking.senate.gov/conf/gr-
mleach.htm (last visited Oct. 9, 2010).
65. See Karl S. Okamoto, After the Bailout: Regulating Systemic Moral Hazard, 57
UCLA L. REV. 183, 195 (2009).
66. See Sorkin & Bajaj, supra note 59. But most industry observers do not expect to
see major changes to the operations of these firms and even expect that the change is
temporary and that the firms will try to shed their BHC status when the market becomes
more stable. Steven Sloan, Can Even Fed Oversight Alter Investment Banking Giants?,
AM. BANKER, Feb. 2, 2009, at 1.
67. The Department of the Treasury has already released a "Blueprint" for revised
regulation that deals specifically with the BHC Act. U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY,
BLUEPRINT FOR A MODERNIZED FINANCIAL REGULATORY STRUCTURE 164 (2008) [here-
inafter TREASURY BLUEPRINT], available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/
Blueprint.pdf. As financial institutions increasingly become BHCs, Congress will need to
decide whether it will lift some BHC Act restrictions to allow these firms to engage in
commercial activity as they have done in the past or solidify the separation of commerce
and banking within these large investment banks. Sloan, supra note 66, at 1. The Treasury
has recently suggested that some of the rigid activity restrictions of the BHC Act on finan-
cial firms be lifted and that a new regulatory framework of broad federal oversight be
implemented. The Treasury proposed allowing commercial firms to own banks in a
blueprint aimed at revamping financial regulation in April 2008, but it is unlikely that such
a plan would be approved in the near future. The Treasury Blueprint outlined a new regu-
latory regime that would have increased supervision of all banking affiliates. See generally
TREASURY BLUEPRINT, supra. See Joe Adler, Paulson Plan Would Open Charters to All
Comers; Banking-Commerce Divide Would End, Fed Would Add Oversight, AM. BANKER,
Apr. 3, 2008, at 1.
68. See generally Sorkin & Bajaj, supra note 59.
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is a blurry distinction between investment banking and commercial bank-
ing-often, the activities of investment banks were primarily financial in
nature and, thus, not dissimilar to the activities conducted in their ILCs. 6 9
This article seeks to highlight the advantages of commercial ownership of
banks and the advantages of a diversified ownership model in banking.
An investment bank has a similar business model to a BHC, which is run
similarly to a bank, and does not add diversity across sectors, as opposed
to a retail or industrial owner of a bank whose business operations and
vulnerabilities differ greatly from a bank and can offer balance and sup-
port to their subsidiary. 70
This article does not address the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLB),
which allowed for the mixing of banking and commerce that created
these investment banking entities. The GLB allowed traditional financial
institutions to engage in various commercial activities, such as securities
and insurance underwriting.71 The wisdom of this expansion has recently
been challenged but is beyond the scope of this article. Although the
term "separation of banking and commerce" has been used to describe
restrictions on bank activities (what a bank can do) and on bank owner-
ship structure (who can own a bank), this article only addresses the latter.
C. TRE WAL-MART APPLICATION
The ILC industry operated quietly in the banking world until 2005
when Wal-Mart filed its application to open an ILC.7 2 Wal-Mart in-
tended to use an ILC to service its credit card transactions in-house to
save the 2% to 3% that it paid to a third-party server.73 However, Wal-
Mart's application drew criticism from the banking industry, policymak-
ers, and consumer groups.74 On June 8, 2006, ninety-eight members of
Congress wrote to the FDIC to request a moratorium on approvals of
69. See Knowledge@Wharton, Banking Reform Proposals: Why They Miss the Mark,
FINANCIAL TIMES (Mar. 15, 2010), http://www.ftpress.com/articles/article.aspx?p=1567488.
70. See Christine E. Blair, The Mixing of Banking and Commerce: Current Policy Is-
sues, 16 FDIC BANKING REV., no. 4, 2004 at 97, 101-02 (2004), available at http://www.fdic.
gov/bank/analytical/Banking/2005;an/article3.pdf.
71. See SEN. COMM. ON BANKING, FINANCE, AND URBAN AFFAIRS, supra note 64.
72. See Application for Deposit Insurance for Wal-Mart Bank, 71 Fed. Reg. 10,531,
10,532 (Mar. 1, 2006) (public hearing notice) [hereinafter Wal-Mart FDIC Application];
Shaheen Pasha, Coming soon: A Wal-Mart Bank?, CNN/MONEY (Oct. 27, 2005, 2:24 PM),
http://money.cnn.com/2005/10/27/news/economy/walmartbanks/.
73. According to the application filed with the FDIC, the bank will provide Wal-Mart
with access to the Automated Clearing House network so that they can process checks and
debit card transactions. See Application for Deposit Insurance for Wal-Mart Bank, supra
note 72. The application also states that Wal-Mart will be the bank's only customer and
the bank will not seek out additional customers. Id.; see Pasha, supra note 72; see also
David Breitkopf, Wal-Mart's Financial Vision: In Payments; Spotlight on An ILC's Role,
AM. BANKER, Oct. 5, 2005, at 1.
74. See Eric Dash, Wal-Mart Abandons Bank Plans, N.Y. TiMiEs, Mar. 17, 2007, at C1,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/17/business/17bank.html; see also Letter from
Camden R. Fine, President and CEO, Indep. Cmty. Bankers of Am., to Donald E. Powell,
Chairman, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. and John F. Carter, Reg'l Dir., Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp.
6 (Aug. 18, 2005), http://www.icba.org/files/ICBASites/PDFs/tr081805.pdf [hereinafter
ICBA Letter].
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commercially owned industrial banks until Congress could consider the
continued viability of the ILC charter.75 The FDIC subsequently im-
posed a six-month moratorium on July 28, 2006,76 and extended it several
times before it finally expired on January 31, 2008.77 Although the FDIC
expressed the opinion that the ILC industry was sound, it issued the mor-
atorium to pass the difficult and controversial decision of what to do with
Wal-Mart's application on to Congress.78 As the FDIC explained in a
statement, "the original moratorium demonstrated that the growth of the
ILC industry, the trend toward commercial company ownership of ILCs
and the nature of some ILC business models have raised significant ques-
tions about the risks to the deposit insurance fund." 79 According to the
FDIC, the moratorium "provide[s] Congress with an opportunity to ad-
dress the issue legislatively while the FDIC considers how best to respond
to any safety and soundness issues surrounding commercial ownership
under existing law."80
To say that Wal-Mart's application was "controversial" would be an
understatement. After the FDIC's moratorium, Congress received more
75. Banking: Representative Roscoe Bartlett, REPRESENTATIVE RoscoE BARTLETr
http://bartlett.house.gov/Issues/Issue/?IssuelD=2047 (last visited Aug. 4, 2010) [hereinafter
Bartlett Statement]; see Industrial Bank Holding Company Act of 2007: Hearing on H.R.
698 Before the H. Comm. On Financial Services, 110th Cong. 10 (2007) (statement of Sheila
C. Bair, Chairman, FDIC) [hereinafter Bair Statement].
76. Bartlett Statement, supra note 75. Roscoe Bartlett and "Reps. Frank and Gillmor,joined by 115 other Members of Congress, wrote to the FDIC on December 7, 2006 and
requested that the moratorium be extended." Statement of Banking Representative Ros-
coe Bartlett. For a complete description of FDIC action since the announcement of the
first moratorium, see Bair Statement, supra note 75, at 10.
77. See Industrial Bank Subsidiaries of Financial Companies, 72 Fed. Reg. 5217,
5219-20 (proposed Feb. 5, 2007) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 354); Joe Adler, As Mora-
torium Ends, Few ILC Seekers Left to Fight, AM. BANKER, Jan. 31 2008, at 1.
78. The FDIC testified that there are no inherent problems in the ILC charter. Bair
Statement, supra note 75, at 10. Comptroller John Dugan, a member of the FDIC board,
expressed his opinion in a board meeting as follows:
In short, denying an ILC application for deposit insurance based merely on
commercial affiliation would be fundamentally inconsistent with first, the ex-
press congressional exemption of ILCs from the Bank Holding Company
Act's restriction on commercial affiliation, and second, the FDIC's track re-
cord in addressing risks raised by such affiliations during the last 20 years.
The continued ability of commercial firms to own ILCs will undoubtedly be a
close and difficult policy decision for Congress, but it is not a close decision
for me as a legal determination to be made by this agency. As a result, if
Congress fails to change the law permitting commercial ownership of ILCs
during the extension of the moratorium, and if a deposit insurance applica-
tion is submitted thereafter by an ILC with commercial affiliations, I will not
vote to deny the application merely because of that affiliation. In the
meantime, I strongly urge Congress to address this issue.
John C. Dugan, Comptroller of the Currency, Statement to the FDIC Board of Directors
Regarding the ILC Moratorium Extension 4 (Jan. 31, 2007), http://www.occ.treas.gov/
news-issuances/news-releases/2007/pub-other-state-2007-aa.pdf [hereinafter Dugan
Statement].
79. Press Release, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., FDIC Extends Moratorium on Industrial
Loan Company Applications by Commercial Companies for One Year; Will Move For-
ward on Applications from Financial Companies (Jan. 31, 2007), http://www.fdic.gov/news/
news/press/2007/pro7007.html.
80. Id.
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than 13,800 letters regarding Wal-Mart's proposed ILC.81 Most com-
ments were in direct opposition to Wal-Mart being granted a charter, but
some also raised concern about the ILC industry in general.82 In May
2007, the House passed legislation that would suspend any further com-
mercial ownership of ILCs.83 During the eighteen month FDIC morato-
rium, however, Wal-Mart conceded to the massive opposition and
withdrew its application.84 Home Depot, along with several other com-
mercial firms, also withdrew its application, taking the momentum away
from the ILC opposition.85
Jane Thompson, president of Wal-Mart Financial Services, justified the
withdrawal, stating that "[s]ince the approval process is now likely to take
years rather than months, we decided to withdraw our application to bet-
ter focus on other ways to serve customers." 86 The FDIC and other fed-
eral regulators welcomed the news.87 FDIC Chairman Sheila C. Bair
stated that "Wal-Mart made a wise choice. This decision will remove the
controversy surrounding their intentions."88 Others, including the Amer-
ican Bankers Association (ABA) remained apprehensive of the ILC
charter and called for change, stating that "Wal-Mart's withdrawal of its
ILC application is a welcome development, but we urge Congress to con-
tinue its work to close the ILC loophole once and for all. The central
concern in the ILC debate-the separation between banking and com-
merce-remains, even with today's announcement." 89
It was Wal-Mart's suspected desire to enter full-scale banking that
drove the opposition to both its application and the ILC industry. 90
Many worried that despite its stated intention, Wal-Mart planned to open
a national bank that could drive traditional retail banks out of business by
offering competitive pricing on its financial products. 91 Although bank-
ing law would potentially allow such an expansion, 92 Wal-Mart stated,
81. Moratorium on Certain Industrial Bank Applications and Notices, 72 Fed. Reg.
5290, 5291-92 (Feb. 5, 2007).
82. Id.
83. Adler, supra note 77, at 1. This legislation as well as Senate Legislation on ILCs
will be discussed in detail in the next section.
84. See Industrial Bank Subsidiaries of Financial Companies, 72 Fed. Reg. 5217,
5218-19 (Feb. 5, 2007); Parija B. Kavilanz, Wal-Mart withdraws industrial banking push,
CNN/MONEY (Mar. 16, 2007, 12:30 PM), http://money.cnn.comI2007/03/16/news/compa-
nies/walmart/index.htm.
85. Adler, supra note 77, at 1. Of the fourteen pending applications before the mora-
torium, only three remained. "[OInly one-Chrysler Financial's, involve[d] a commercial
parent." Id.
86. Kavilanz, supra note 84.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Wal-Mart Drops Bid to Form Bank, INs. J. (Mar. 16, 2007), http://www.in-
surancejournal.com/news/national/2007/03/16 77 810.htm.
90. Liza Featherstone, The Bank of Wal-Mart?, THE NATION (Aug. 31, 2005), http://
www.thenation.com/article/bank-wal-mart.
91. See ICBA Letter, supra note 74, at 2-4.
92. According to Utah law, after three years, an ILC is no longer bound to their origi-
nal business plan, and if the board approves a change, the ILC charter could be amended
to include national branching. See 12 C.F.R. § 333.101(a) (2007). The amendment to the
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before dropping their bid, that it would be willing to accept a charter that
prohibited any future branching.93 Despite the company's denials that it
did not intend to establish banking branches or engage in lending, 94 the
fears that it would do so appear to be somewhat justified. Wal-Mart has
attempted to enter banking, in one form or another, for over a decade.95
Moreover, Wal-Mart already operates a full service bank in Mexico, 96
and many fear that it will do the same in the United States because of its
repeated attempts to enter banking.97 Wal-Mart could have a damaging
effect on community banking should it choose to enter banking and use
predatory pricing as it has in the past. 98 The anti-competitive fears of a
charter would also have to be approved by the FDIC. Wal-Mart's ILC could potentially
branch into twenty-two states that either allow the ILC charter or have agreed to the opt-in
provisions under the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Act of 1994. Lloyd,
infra note 94, at 226.
93. See Industrial Loan Companies and Industrial Banks, 71 Fed. Reg. 49,456, 49,458
(Aug. 23, 2006); Lloyd, infra note 94, at 227.
94. Rob Garver, Wal-Mart's Financial Vision: In Retail: Focus on Unbanked, Partner-
ships, Home Grown ATMs, AM. BANKER, Oct. 5. 2005, at 1. "According to Jane Thomp-
son, the President of Wal-Mart Financial Services, Wal-Mart had no desire to establish
branches or engage in lending, and the ILC was 'not a bank a consumer [would] ever see.'
In addition, Thompson pointed out that Wal-Mart actively encourages community banks to
open branches in its stores." Zachariah J. Lloyd, Waging War with Wal-Mart: A Cry for
Change Threatens the Future of Industrial Loan Corporations, 14 FORDHAM J. CORP. &
FIN. L. 211, 227 (2008) (citations omitted). "Wal-Mart currently has arrangements with
more than 300 banks, which operate more than 1,100 branches in Wal-Mart stores across
the country." Garver, supra, at 1.
95. Kevin K. Nolan, Wal-Mart's Industrial Loan Company: The Risk to Community
Banks, 10 N.C. BANKING INST. 187, 191-92 (2006) (describing various attempts by Wal-
Mart to purchase banks in Oklahoma, California, and a national bank chain, TD Bank, all
of which having been blocked by state or national regulators); see also Bloomberg News,
Wal-Mart Wants To Buy Savings and Loan, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 1999, at C31.
96. Carolyn Whelan, Wal-Mart gets its bank-in Mexico, CNN/MONEY (Jan. 29, 2008,
4:08 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2008/01/28/news/internationallwalmart-bank.fortune/
index.htm.
97. Wal-Mart attempted once before to establish a California ILC, but the California
legislature, in an obvious attempt to target Wal-Mart, passed legislation barring commer-
cial ownership of ILCs. Rob Blackwell, Wal-Mart After ILC Again, This Time in Utah Met
with FDIC, ICBA; Top Exec. Said Picked for Card-Focused Unit, AM. BANKER, Mar. 8,
2005, at 1; Christine Daleiden, Wal-Mart: The Debate over Commercial Ownership of In-
dustrial Loan Companies, 11 MAR. HAW. BAR J.23; 25-26 (2007); see also Nicola Leiter,
Wal-Mart's Industrial Loan Company, 25 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 101, 101-02
(2006).
98. Camden Fine, President of the Independent Community Bankers of America
(ICBA): "Fifteen years ago, Wal-Mart said it had no designs on the grocery business and 20
years ago, they said they had no designs on the hardware business but now they dominate
both businesses." Lloyd, supra note 94, at 227-28 (citing Shaheen Pasha); Wal-Mart Bank
faces tough opposition, CNN/MONEY (Jan. 4, 2006, 1:46 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2006/
01/04/news/companies/walmart bank/). Through their use of "predatory pricing and other
techniques," they tend to "run all local competition out of business." Id. at 227 (citing
Letter from Sound Banking Coalition to John F. Carter, Reg'l Dir., Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp.
6 (Aug. 17, 2005), http://www.icba.org/files/ICBASites/PDFs/sbcO81705.pdf). "Typically,
after Wal-Mart expands into another sector of the market and reduces local competition-
or does away with it entirely-Wal-Mart frequently increases its own prices." Id. at 228
(citing Nolan, supra note 95, at 194). "An Iowa State University study revealed that after
Wal-Mart's expansion into Iowa, 555 grocery stores, 298 hardware stores, 293 building
materials stores, and 116 drug stores closed their doors." Id.; see also KENNETH E. STONE,
COMPETING WITH THE DiscouNT MASS MERCHANDISERS, 23 tbl. 2 (1995), available at
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hypothetical Wal-Mart national bank have driven much of the opposition
to the ILC charter,99 but the arguments waged against the ILC have fo-
cused on safety and risk concerns, which if legitimate would be a valid
reason to discontinue the charter.100 This Article will address these argu-
ments and show that they are not legitimate. If Wal-Mart were to operate
a national bank, it may pose a significant competitive risk to community
banking but would be among the safest banks in the country because it
would be backed by a large, highly capitalized, and stable commercial
giant.101
D. CONGRESSIONAL LEGISLATION
The House Committee on Financial Services (Committee) held a hear-
ing in 2006 regarding industrial banks.102 The general counsels from the
FDIC and the Federal Reserve Board, as well as many other industry
observers, testified before the Committee, discussing many facets of in-
dustrial banks.103 In May 2007, the House passed the Industrial Bank
Holding Company Act of 2007 (H.R. 698), which prohibited commercial
firms from acquiring ILCs, by a vote of 371-16.104 Under the bill, a com-
pany is considered "commercial if it derivels] 15% or more of its gross
revenue, on a consolidated basis, from non-financial activities." 0 5 H.R.
698 also gave the FDIC supervisory authority over any parent company
http://www.econ.iastate.edu/faculty/stone/1995 IAWMStudy.pdf (as cited in Lloyd,
supra note 94, at 228). Other studies indicate that "for every Wal-Mart 'Supercenter'
opened, two local groceries will close." Id. at 228-29 (citing Nolan, supra note 95, at 194).
Therefore, Nolan concludes, a Wal-Mart ILC could damage "the community banking in-
dustry (if a Wal-Mart ILC charter is amended to include full retail banking services) in
each of its Supercenters nationwide. Id. at 229 (citing Nolan, supra note 95, at 194).
99. See Wendy Zellner, Wal-Mart: Your New Banker?, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK
(Feb. 5, 2007), available at http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/05_06/639190
46 mzOll.htm; see also Michelle Clark Neely, Industrial Loan Companies Come Out of the
Shadows, THE REG'L EcoNOMIST (Fed. Res. Bank of St. Louis, St. Louis, Mo.), July 2007,
http://www.stlouisfed.org/publications/re/articles/?id=27.
100. See Neely, supra note 99.
101. See Suzanne Struglinski & Jenifer K. Nii, Wal-Mart bank delayed, DESERET NEWS,
Feb. 1, 2007, at El; see also Letter from David B. Winder, member of Bd. Of Dirs. For Wal-
Mart Bank, to Sheila C. Bair, chairman of Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. (Oct. 10, 2006), available
at http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/federal/2006/06c100ilc.pdf (last visited Aug. 4,
2010).
102. Industrial Loan Companies: A Review of Charter, Ownership, and Supervision Is-
sues: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit of the H.
Comm. on Financial Services, 109th 1 Cong. (2006).
103. Industrial Bank Subsidiaries of Financial Companies, 72 Fed. Reg. 5217, 5219 (Feb.
5, 2007) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 86.).
104. Press Release, H. Comm. on Financial Services, House Overwhelmingly Passes
Industrial Bank Holding Company Act (May 21, 2007), http://financialservices.house.gov/
press110/press052107.shtml. See H.R. 698, 110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007). Congressman
Gillmor and Financial Services Committee Chairman Barney Frank introduced H.R. 698
on January 29, 2007. Press Release, H. Comm. On Financial Services, supra. Similar legis-
lation was introduced in the Senate. See S. 1356, 110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007).
105. H.R. 698 also exempts commercial companies that already own ILCs from this
prohibition under a grandfather provision. See H.R. REP. No. 110-155, at 9 (2007); see also
H.R. 698, 110th Cong. § 51(c), (f)(2)-(3) (1st Sess. 2007).
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of an ILC.10 6
The Senate did not respond with similar legislation at the time and the
FDIC's moratorium expired on January 31, 2008, but was subsequently
re-installed by the Dodd-Frank bill.' 07 Several states also enacted legis-
lation that would prohibit or restrict ILCs chartered in other states from
establishing branches in their states.108 The broader financial collapse
has focused lawmakers on more comprehensive banking reform, making
it unlikely that an act targeted at a particular banking charter will be dis-
cussed in the legislature. However, the ILC was discussed in the pro-
posed White House and Senate bills addressing broad banking changes
and was part of the Dodd-Frank reform package. 109
E. WHITE HOUSE AND SENATE LEGISLATION
On June 17, 2009, the Obama administration released a comprehensive
plan for regulatory reform, which proposed an extensive overhaul of
bank regulation and regulatory structure." 0 As part of the plan, referred
to as "The White Papers," the administration proposed a stricter separa-
tion of banking and commerce as well as a complete ban of the ILC char-
ter.11' The final Dodd-Frank bill, which was passed in July 2010, issued a
three-year moratorium on new ILC charters and directed the GAO to
conduct a study on the ILC charter to determine its safety and sound-
ness.112 Industry observers believe that it is unlikely that the administra-
106. H.R. 698; see H.R. REP. No. 110-115, at 9.
107. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, § 603, 124 Stat. 1376, 1597 (2010) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1815). In February
2008, Senator Dodd attempted to approve a bill in the Senate Banking Committee that
would ban commercial ownership of ILCs. Legislative Update, AM. BANKER, Feb. 14,
2008, at 7. The bill did not gain enough votes to pass the committee and, if revisited, is
unlikely to pass on the floor of the Senate for several reasons. First, the moratorium al-
lowed the FDIC to evade the decision completely rather than merely delaying it because
Wal-Mart dropped its bids and thus deflated the controversy surrounding ILCs. Alder,
supra note 77, at 1. Second, the bill included a large exemption for automakers, which
happen to be the only type of commercial firm currently seeking ILC charters, thereby
making the legislation a symbolic gesture. Id. This huge exemption seems to suggest that
the opposition was aimed at Wal-Mart rather than at ILCs. Given the current economic
climate, it is unlikely that the government would deny automakers charters for ILCs be-
cause it could provide them needed liquidity. A May 2, 2007 mark-up of the passed House
legislation also included a large exception for automakers. See Legislative Update, AM.
BANKER, May 10, 2007, at 7.
108. Lloyd, supra note 94, at 232 n.151. These states are Iowa, Maryland, Missouri,
Wisconsin, Virginia, and Vermont. Wal-Mart's Industrial Loan Company Talking
Points,WAL-MART WATCH, http://walmartwatch.com/img/documents/ILC.pdf (last visited
May 17, 2010); see, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-232.2 (Supp. 2009) (repealed by Act 2007,
c.1, cl.2, eff. Feb 5. 2007).
109. See, e.g., TREASURY BLUEPRINT, supra note 67, at 39; infra note 110.
110. DEP'T OF TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: A NEw FOUNDATION
(2009), available at http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/regs/FinalReport-web.pdf; see
also Stephen Labaton, Some Lawmakers Question Expanded Reach for the Fed, N.Y.
TIMES, June 17, 2009, at Bi.
111. Harry Terris, Pros, Cons of Unplugging GE Capital from Its Parent, AM. BANKER,
Nov. 11, 2009, at 1; see also Hopkins & Adler, supra note 5, at 1.
112. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, § 603, 124 Stat. 1376, 1597 (2010) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1815).
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tion will achieve a ban on the ILC charter because it is widely recognized
that the charter had nothing to do with the financial crisis. 1 13 In addition,
there are many powerful supporters of the ILC on both sides of the politi-
cal spectrum who advocate for its continued existence. 1 14 Nevertheless,
the ILC has received national attention once again because of its unique
status at the intersection of commerce and banking. 115 Now that the dust
has settled from Wal-Mart's original application and the financial crisis
has provided a new context to think about banking, it is time to revisit the
ILC issue in a new light.
III. THE DEBATE
A. VALUE OF THE ILC
Ownership of an ILC "is effectively the only vehicle by which nonfi-
nancial firms can enter banking, and by which nonbank financial firms
can own a depository institution without being subject to holding com-
pany supervision .... ."116 Non-BHCs seeking to conduct credit or bank-
ing activities can do so mainly through an ILC or one of the few and
limited financial firms that are not classified as banks.117 Many commer-
cial firms, such as automakers, extend credit as part of their core business;
the safest and most competitive way for these firms to fund financing is
through a bank because they can avoid the transaction costs of dealing
with outside lenders.118 Although parent companies do not use ILCs to
finance their own operations, they often use ILCs to offer complementary
products and services to enhance the parent's core businesses. 119
Commercial firms have established ILCs to meet various business and
financing demands. 120 Indeed, the rapid growth of the industry shows
that the ILC model has met a rising demand. For example, the invest-
ment banking firm of Merrill Lynch, which formerly owned the largest
ILC, Merrill Lynch Bank, USA, focused on consumer and business
113. See Hopkins & Adler, supra note 5.
114. Senator Reid, Congressman Frank, Senator Bennett, and Senator Dodd all sup-
port the ILC charter and hold pivotal positions on the Senate and Congressional banking
committees. See Stacy Kaper, Lawmakers Doubt Key Goal of Reg Reform Plan, AM.
BANKER, June 19, 2009, at 1; Joe Adler, Frank Favors Keeping Existing ILCs, AM.
BANKER, July 31, 2009, at 16; Emily Flitter & Stacy Kaper, Most Likely to Succeed: Pieces
of Obama Plan, AM. BANKER, June 18, 2009, at 1. Note, however, that Senator Bennett
and Senator Dodd will not be returning to the Senate next year so the case against ILCs
may have been weakened due to the departure of these advocates or the ILC issue.
115. See Terris, supra note 111, at 1.
116. Ergungor & Thomson, supra note 42, at 2.
117. Commercial firms can own credit card companies, nondeposit trust companies,
mortgage companies, or commercial or consumer finance companies without being subject
to the BHC Act. S. REP. No. 111-176, at 83 (2010). There are also various thrifts and non-
banks whose ownership was grandfathered in through CEBA and various other legislative
actions. Johnson & Kaufman, supra note 20, at 40.
118. See Lloyd, supra note 94, at 245; Ergungor & Taylor, supra note 42, at 2.
119. Rule 23A forbids an ILC from funding the parent company. See infra notes
239-40 and accompanying text.
120. Ergungor & Thompson, supra note 42, at 2.
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loans. 121 Large investment banks and financial institutions, such as
Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, and UBS, owned and operated many of
the largest ILCs under a similar model. 122 Another model for ILC own-
ership is that of commercial and retail corporations, such as GE Capital
and Target. These corporations use their ILCs to process financial trans-
actions to enhance their retail operations.123 A third group of ILC own-
ers, including BMW and Volkswagen, use their ILCs to directly support
their businesses by offering direct financing for their automotive sales.124
The rising desire for firms to enter financing and banking activities is
fueled both by changes in the law and changes in the marketplace, includ-
ing expanding credit options. 125 For decades, banks were the primary
source of credit. 126 Today, companies and individuals have many non-
bank options for obtaining credit. 127 Many companies want to own an
ILC because it allows for greater efficiency and cost-reduction in their
business operations.128 There is a growing need for commercial firms to
integrate different parts of their business as technology, and the changing
face of banking and finance has allowed many firms to diversify their
products and offer their customers a range of financing and credit
options.129
There have been several large exceptions to both the moratorium and
the proposed congressional legislation, demonstrating that Congress and
the FDIC seem to recognize that the ILC structure serves a useful func-
tion.'30 As part of the automakers' plea for a bailout before Congress on
December 4, 2008, Ford Motors testified that it needed an ILC to free up
necessary capital to finance auto loans.131 Ford intends to use its ILC as
121. Johnson & Kaufman, supra note 20, at 42.
122. Industrial Loan Companies: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing
and Urban Affairs, 110th Cong. 12-13 (2007) (statement of John F. Bovenzi, Chief Operat-
ing Officer, FDIC) [hereinafter Bovenzi Attachment]; Steve Sloan & Joe Adler, What Fu-
ture May Hold for Two Converts, AM. BANKER, Sept. 23, 2008, at 1.
123. Johnson & Kaufman, supra note 20, at 43.
124. GAO REPORT, supra note 10, at 18.
125. Sutton Testimony, supra note 23, at 11.
126. Id. at 52.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 52-53.
129. Id. at 52.
130. For example, in November of 2006, the FDIC set the moratorium aside for
GMAC's ILC so that it could approve Cerberus Capital Management's purchase of the
ILC. Press Release, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. FDIC Press Release No. 103-2006, FDIC Bd.
Approves Change in Control Notice for GMAC Auto. Bank (Nov. 15, 2006) (on file with
author). In a press release, the FDIC stated that it needed to act on this ILC "to avoid the
potential for substantial interference with a major restructuring by General Motors Corpo-
ration." Marcy Gordon, GMAC Bank Takeover is Approved, DESERET NEWS, Nov. 16,
2006, at E4. Additionally, the FDIC also suspended its moratorium to grant WellPoint Inc.
permission to obtain FDIC insurance for its ILC. Joe Adler, ILC Gets OK After Unusual
Consultation, AM. BANKER, Sept. 13, 2007, at 1; see also Peter J. Wallison, Viewpoint:
Carveout Reveals ILC Bill's True Nature, AM. BANKER, June 29, 2007, at 11.
131. "Having an Industrial Loan Company will place us on a more equal footing with
our major competitors who already have such banks. More importantly, it will benefit
consumers by providing us another resource for reasonably priced capital, thus helping us
provide credit to our customers and dealers," the submission said. Ford Motor Company,
1158 [Vol. 63
The ILC and the Reconstruction of U.S. Banking
other automakers are using theirs-as a source of credit for its customers
and dealers.132 The notion that automakers should be given an exception
to own an ILC because of their financial weakness subverts the argument
that the separation of banking and commerce is needed to protect the
safety and soundness of the banking system.133 The Federal Reserve
Board states that their regulation of BHCs is "necessary to ensure they
will remain sources of strength for their subsidiary banks."134 But Con-
gress seems to now be saying that a weak parent company should be
granted an exception because of its greater need for the charter.135 It
seems that the driving force opposing the ILC derives less from concerns
about maintaining safety and soundness in banking and more from a de-
sire to exclude certain companies from the banking sector.136
B. ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE ILC
A broad range of groups have voiced arguments against the ILC
around two themes.137 First, on a practical level, opponents of the ILC
fear that the lack of federal consolidated supervision for parent compa-
nies of ILCs endangers the stability of the financial system.'38 Second,
and on a more theoretical level, opponents believe that the charter is an
exception to the long history of separation of banking and commerce that
the government has imposed in order to protect the safety and soundness
of the banking system.139 This latter argument did not originate with the
ILC charter or the Wal-Mart application but was rejuvenated by both.140
Business Plan, Submitted to the Senate Banking Committee, Dec. 2, 2008, at 5, http://
banking.senate.gov/publicl-files/Brfgl2308AutoPRESENTATIONOFFORDMOTOR
COMPANY122_SenateFinal_.pdf (last visited May 18, 2010).
132. Editorial, Ford Bets the Farm and Sells the Company Jets, JusT-AUTo (Dec. 2,
2008), http://www.just-auto.com/article.aspx?id=97032.
133. Wallison, supra note 130, at 11.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. See generally id. (arguing legislation is more about protecting the banking industry
from competitors).
137. The arguments are gathered from Congressional testimony during the House's ex-
amination of the ILC following the FDIC moratorium as well as several other works of
scholarship and industry reports. The most prominent critics of the ILC in recent years
have included Rep. Jim Leach, the GAO, the ICBA, the ABA, and Federal Reserve Vice
Chairman Donald Kohn. See Kohn Testimony, supra note 51, at 12-13; id. at 38-40 (testi-
mony of James P. Ghiglieri, Jr. for the ICBA); id. at 40-41 (testimony of Earl D. McVicker
for the ABA); GAO REPORT supra note 10, at 82-86; see also U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABIL-
rry OFFICE, INDUSTRIAL LOAN CORPORATIONs RECENT ASSET GROWTH AND COMMER-
CIAL INTEREST HIGHLIGHT DIFFERENCES IN REGULATORY AUTHORITY TESTIMONY
BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND CONSUMER CREDIT, Com-
mittee On Financial Services, House of Representatives 3-4 (2006), available at http://
financialservices.house.gov/medialpdfl071206rjh.pdf. For recent arguments against ILCs,
see Wilmarth, supra note 25, at 1588. See also Arthur E. Wilmarth, Viewpoint: Giving
GMAC Aid Would Be Big Mistake, AM. BANKER, Dec. 3, 2008, at 10.
138. GAO REPORT, supra note 10, at 33.
139. Wilmarth, supra note 25, at 1570-71.
140. The Federal Reserve and the FDIC have largely shaped the debate over the mix-
ing of banking and commerce. Two important presentations of the long debate are the
1982 essay, Are Banks Special?, written by Gerald Corrigan, then President of the Federal
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis and the 1987 bank study released by the FDIC, Mandate for
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Some also oppose the ILC because they claim that it is a regulatory
loophole that the government needs to close and that the ILC exception
allows commercial firms to "evade" U.S. banking laws. 1 4 1 However, the
ILC is not a product of an unintended loophole; rather, it is a product of
several legislative measures dating from 1956 to 1999 expressly exempting
ILCs from BHC Act restrictions.14 2 Regardless, the loophole argument
does not address the safety of the ILC, which is the only appropriate rea-
son to close an ILC "loophole," if there is one. As I will demonstrate, the
arguments against the ILC have not successfully established that the
charter poses a threat to the safety and soundness of our financial system
or that ILCs are more risky or prone to failure than commercial banks.143
Conversely, the evidence shows that ILCs are among the safest banks in
the country after having been tested by the recent financial crisis-a re-
sult, I argue, of their unique commercial partnerships.14 4
1. Need for Federal Consolidated Bank Supervision
Many opponents of the ILC argue that the charter is more prone to
risk because a commercial parent company of an ILC is not subject to
federal consolidated supervision.14 5 As Donald L. Kohn, Vice Chairman
of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, expressed:
[Federal Consolidated Supervision] allows the Federal Reserve to
understand the financial and managerial strengths and risks within
the consolidated organization as a whole and gives the supervisor the
authority and ability to identify and resolve significant management,
operational, capital or other deficiencies within the overall organiza-
tion before they pose a danger to the organization's subsidiary in-
sured banks.14 6
The BHC Act mandates that the FRB, the Office of Thrift Supervision
(OTS), and the FDIC, which together serve as federal consolidated su-
pervisors, regulate any company that owns a bank.14 7 Because parent
companies of ILCs are not BHCs, they are not subject to federal consoli-
dated supervision.148 State regulators and the FDIC regulate ILCs; the
Change. E. Gerald Corrigan, Are Banks Special?, FED. RES. BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS ANN.
REP. (1982); FDIC, MANDATE FOR CHANGE: RESTRUCTURING THE BANKING INDUSTRY
(1987) [hereinafter FDIC, MANDATE FOR CHANGE].
141. ILCs-A Review of Charter, Ownership, and Supervision Issues: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit, H. Comm. on Financial Services
(June 12, 2006) (testimony of Scott G. Alvarez, General Counsel, Board of Governors
Federal Reserve System) [hereinafter Alvarez Testimony].
142. The BHC exempted ILCs and the exception was held and even expanded by the
Garn-St. Germain Act (1982), CEBA (1987), and the GLB (1999). See Johnson & Kauf-
man, supra note 20, at 39-41. The GLB retained the original CEBA provisions and added
a more liberal element to the exemption. See 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(2)(H) (2006).
143. See infra part III.B.1.
144. See infra part III.B.2.e.
145. See Wilmarth, supra note 25, at 1617; Kohn Testimony, supra note 51, at 12-13.
146. See Kohn Testimony, supra note 51, at 132.
147. 12 U.S.C. H§ 1841, 1843 (2006).
148. See Kohn Testimony, supra note 51, at 12-13.
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relevant industry regulator, usually the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion (SEC), regulates the parent companies.149 However, this argument
rests on the assumption that a broad regulator of the parent company is
able to detect risk better than the bottom-up approach of the FDIC.o50
If it were proven that federal consolidated supervision could reduce
risks in the banking system, the government could easily remedy the
problem by bringing commercial parents of ILCs under federal over-
sight.151 The White Papers suggest a greater regulatory reach over com-
panies that are financially relevant but not over BHCs.152  The
commercial parents of ILCs are already highly regulated entities that
could be subjected to further oversight without having to change their
core business to control a bank, as the BHC Act requires.153 However,
the critics have not shown evidence suggesting that the Federal Reserve's
approach is any more effective than the approach of the FDIC and the
state regulators. In fact, the Federal Reserve has recently come under
intense criticism, and virtually every comprehensive banking reform pro-
posal addresses the fundamental weaknesses of the Federal Reserve's
monitoring system and proposes changes to that structure.154
The FDIC has both the authority and the capacity to effectively regu-
late ILCs and their parents.' 55 The FDIC and the state regulators of
ILCs have proven to be capable regulators and have formed and followed
a rigorous system for evaluating and managing risks.156 ILCs that are
owned by commercial firms have rarely caused significant supervisory
problems, and their record of safe and sound practices compares favora-
149. See West, supra note 9, at 6 n.8. Ed Leary explains, "While not subject to regula-
tion as bank holding companies, industrial bank owners are subject to many of the same
requirements as bank holding companies. As a result, safeguards already exist to protect
these depository institutions against abuses by the companies that control them or activi-
ties of affiliates that might jeopardize the safety and soundness of the institutions or endan-
ger the deposit insurance system." Leary Testimony, supra note 19, at 165.
150. See Kohn Testimony, supra note 51, at 12-13.
151. A common regulator with plenary oversight responsibility over the many players
in our financial system could ensure the safety of our system by regulating all affiliate
relationships between the various commercial, financial, and banking players. In 2008, the
Treasury stated: "A single prudential regulator focusing on safety and soundness of firms
with federal guarantees, similar to the OCC, but with appropriate authority to deal with
affiliate relationship issues. Prudential regulation in this context would be applied to indi-
vidual firms, and it would operate like the current regulation of insured depository institu-
tions, with capital adequacy requirements, investment limits, activity limits, and direct on-
site risk management supervision. The prudential regulator would oversee firms with ex-
plicit government guarantees." TREASURY BLUEPRINT, supra note 67, at 18.
152. The White House proposal states that companies that are Tier 1 FHCs, defined as
systemically important financial firms, would be regulated by the Federal Reserve. Strictly
commercial firms would not qualify as Tier 1 FHCs. See Dep't of Treasury, supra note 110,
at 10.
153. Sutton Testimony, supra note 23, at 52.
154. See Labaton, supra note 110.
155. See Sutton Testimony, supra note 23, at 7-8; Jones statement, supra note 14, at
10-13.
156. Jones Statement, supra note 14, at 19-20.
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bly with other depository institutions.15 7 It has not been shown that the
types of risk that threaten banks have more to do with the identity of the
regulator or the owner as opposed to the management of the individual
institution.158
The FDIC manages every stage of ILC conversion, including evaluat-
ing all entry applications and sometimes requiring a change of structure
as a precondition to acceptance. 159 The FDIC has the same supervisory
powers over the parent companies of ILCs that it has over the parent and
affiliates of any other bank; that is, the FDIC's oversight and enforce-
ment power extends to the parent or affiliates of any bank whose activi-
ties affect that bank.160 The FDIC has statutory authority to examine and
take action against any ILC affiliate in order to protect it from risky ac-
tions by affiliates,161 including issuing a cease-and-desist order.162 In fact,
the FDIC has used this power on several occasions to reach outside a
bank in order to manage risk. Most notably, the FDIC recently issued a
cease-and-desist order to an ILC's corporate parent for problems relating
to the underwriting of subprime mortgages.163
Similarly, the State of Utah, which is the primary state regulator for
most of the nation's ILCs, has developed a sophisticated monitoring sys-
tem and has plenary control over both ILCs and their parent compa-
nies.164 Utah's application process is very similar to that of the FDIC and
examines the parent's reputation and financial standing as well as several
157. See generally CANTWELL F. MUCKENFUSS III & ROBERT C. EAGER, The Separa-
tion of Banking and Commerce Revisited, in THE MIXING OF BANKING & COMMERCE 39
(2007). "'As Chairman Bair stated at the 2007 House Hearing: 'FDIC supervisory policies
regarding any depository institution, including an ILC, are concerned with organizational
relationships, particularly compliance with the rules and regulations intended to prevent
potentially abusive practices. . . . The FDIC's overall examination experience with ILCs
has been similar to the larger population of insured institutions, and the causes and pat-
terns displayed by problem ILCs have been like those of other institutions.' She noted no
instance of FDIC enforcement due to abusive practices." Id. at 59 n.59.
158. Press Release, Donald E. Powell, Chairman, FDIC, The ILC Debate: Regulatory
and Supervisory Issues, Remarks Before the Conference of State Bank Supervisors (May
30, 2003) [hereinafter Powell Remarks]. Donald Powell, reflecting on two decades of
FDIC experience, states: "It is important to note here that risk posed by any depository
institution depends on the appropriateness of the institution's business plan and model,
management's competency to run the bank, the quality of the institution's risk-manage-
ment processes, and, of course, the institution's level of capital . . . . Further, the firewalls
and systems of governance safeguarding ILCs from misuse by their parent companies are,
in many cases, more stringent than what exists in many affiliates of bank holding compa-
nies. In part, the generally positive experience of the ILC charter in recent years is attribu-
table to a continually evolving supervisory approach that considers each institution's
purpose and placement within the organizational structure." Id.
159. 12 U.S.C. § 1819(a) (2006) (expanding the FDIC's incidental powers).
160. Id. § 1820(b)(2). For a comprehensive view of FDIC supervisory power and au-
thority, see West, supra note 9, at 5-13.
161. 12 U.S.C. § 1820(b); see also id. § 1820(b)(4)(A).
162. In addition to cease and desist powers, the FDIC can impose civil money penalties,
involuntary termination of insurance, or divestiture. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b), (c), (d), (e), (i).
163. Press Release, FDIC, FDIC Issues Cease and Desist Order Against Fremont In-
vestment and Loan, Brea California, and Its Parents (Mar. 7, 2007).
164. See generally Leary Remarks, supra note 53.
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other factors before approving an ILC charter.165 Utah can examine an
ILC and take any enforcement or remedial action necessary against a
bank and any affiliate.166 The state can force a change of management,
issue cease-and-desist orders, force mergers or acquisitions, and even
take possession of the institution.167 In addition, the Commissioner has
the direct authority to take an enforcement action against the holding
company or any affiliate.168
Some industry observers argue that Utah and FDIC oversight is more
effective than federal consolidated supervision because it targets the
safety of the bank and is not divided between different regulators.169 Va-
rious regulators oversee traditional BHCs and their banks, and the pro-
cess of communication is not always smooth.170 Furthermore, Utah also
participates in the FDIC's Large Bank Supervision Program (LIDI Pro-
gram), which places a state regulator on-site at an ILC of a large or com-
plex company at all times to ensure the safety and soundness of the
ILC.171
The argument that ILC ownership by commercial firms should not be
allowed because of the lack of federal consolidated supervision is not per-
suasive because it has not been proven that bank-centered supervision is
less able to detect risk than top-down supervision or supervision of the
parent. Bill Seidman, the former FDIC chairman, argued twenty years
ago that the best way to achieve a flexible and sound financial system was
to take a "bank-centric approach." 172 Seidman's advice "was to ensure
that regulators be given sufficient powers to regulate the relationship be-
tween banking and commerce rather than not allow it."' 7 3
Notwithstanding, it is uncertain whether the structure or scope of a
banking regulator can ensure safety in a banking system. A study con-
ducted in 2002 analyzed bank performance and supervision in fifty-five
countries and found "little support at best to the belief that any particular
bank supervisory structure will greatly affect bank performance."1 74
165. See What is a Utah Industrial Bank?, UTAH DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL INSTITU-
TIoNs, http://www.dfi.utah.gov/whatisIB.htm (last visited Oct. 7, 2010).
166. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 7-1-313 (LexisNexis 2009).
167. Id. §§ 7-1-307, 7-1-308, 7-2-1(3).
168. Id. §§ 7-1-307, 308, 313, 314, 501, 7-2-1.
169. Sutton Testimony, supra note 23, at 51-52.
170. Id. at 203-04.
171. Utah Commissioner Leary notes, "Utah is participating with the FDIC in the
Large Bank Supervision Program for [several] industrial bank[s.] . . . . The supervision of
these large banks is coordinated by a full-time relationship manger [sic] for the State as
well as the FDIC." Leary Remarks, supra note 53, at 4. These examiners coordinate the
implementation of the supervisory plan for each bank. This plan generally involves three
targeted reviews that roll-up to an annual Examination Report that is reviewed with man-
agement and the board. See id.
172. SHEILA BAIR, The Fourth Wave-The Mixing of Banking & Commerce, in THE
MIXING OF BANKING & COMMERCE, supra note 157, at 9, 11.
173. Id. at 11.
174. James R. Barth et al., A Cross-Country Analysis of the Bank Supervisory Frame-
work and Bank Performance, 12 FIN. MARKETS, INSTITUTIONS & INSTRUMENTS 67, 67
(2003).
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Nevertheless, policymakers are currently engaged in the process of re-
forming and restructuring U.S. banking regulators in order to more effec-
tively protect the banking sector and the economy from the failures that
caused the recent credit crisis that crippled the nation's banks.175 As they
do so, they will need to reexamine some of the previously accepted prin-
ciples of banking, such as which regulatory structure ensures safety and
soundness. While that question is beyond the scope of this Article, the
ILC supervisory structure is an example of the success of bottom-up
supervision.
2. Traditional Separation of Commerce and Banking
The main argument waged against the ILC is that commercial owner-
ship of the ILC goes against the traditional U.S. policy of separation of
commerce and banking.176 The separation of banking and commerce,
however, is not a long-standing "tradition" but a restriction imposed
through a few acts of legislation. The first legislative separation of bank-
ing and commerce occurred in the aftermath of the Great Depression,
and the restriction against commercial firm ownership of banks, the main
focus of this Article, did not begin until 1970.1' "Until 1956, any corpo-
ration could own any number of commercial banks";178 and until the pas-
sage of the second amendment of the BHC Act in 1970, any nonbank
entity could own one commercial bank.179 Though the wisdom of mixing
banking and commerce is the subject of intense debate, many scholars
have dispelled the notion that the separation of commerce and banking is
a long-standing principle guiding U.S. banking history.180 In fact, a 1987
FDIC study argues that there has never been a complete separation of
175. See, e.g., TREASURY BLUEPRINT, supra note 67, at 1.
176. Wilmarth, supra note 25, at 1539; see also Paul Volcker, Chairman, Bd. of Gover-
nors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Statement Before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate (Jan. 21, 1987), in 73 FED. RES. BULL., Mar. 1987, at 199; Alan
Greenspan, H.R. 10, The Financial Services Competitiveness Act of 1997, Testimony
Before the Committee on Banking and Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives
(May 22, 1997); James Ghiglieri Jr., President of Alpha Comty. Bank & Chairman of In-
dep. Cmty. Bankers of Am., Indus. Loan Cos., Testimony Before the U.S. House of Repre-
sentatives Committee on Financial Services 2 (April 25, 2007), available at http://
financialservices.house.gov/pdflGhiglieri.pdf [hereinafter ICBA Testimony] ("The ILC
charter continues to threaten our nation's historic separation of banking and commerce
and undermine our system of holding company supervision, harming consumers and
threatening financial stability."); Kohn Testimony, supra note 51, at 1 ("If left unchecked,
this recent and potential growth of firms operating under the [ILC] exception threatens to
undermine the decisions that Congress has made concerning the separation of banking and
commerce in the American [society].").
177. MUCKENFUSS & EAGER, supra note 157. See generally Haubrich & Santos, supra
note 3, at 144.
178. Huertas, supra note 1, at 744.
179. Id. in 1970, the BHC Act defined the term "bank" for its purposes to be an insti-
tution that makes commercial loans and accepts deposits payable on demand; any other
corporation could own commercial banks that fulfilled one condition but not the other.
Carl Felsenfeld, Non-Bank Banks: An Issue in Need of a Policy, 41 Bus. L. 99, 109-11, 113
(1985).
180. See Huertas, supra note 1, at 755; Joseph G. Haubrich & Joao A.C. Santos, Bank-
ing and Commerce: A Liquidity Approach (Bank for Int'l Settlements, Working Paper No.
1164 [Vol. 63
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commerce and banking in America. 181
At their inception, banks and commercial firms were difficult to distin-
guish and were all "merchant banks."1 82 Most private banks were estab-
lished only to support commercial trading activity, and many banks, such
as Wells Fargo and J.P. Morgan, were directly involved in commercial
ventures. 183 Some state charters even allowed banks to maintain an own-
ership position in other companies or to directly combine with them. 184
"[A] prominent example of the mixing of banking and commerce is the
chartering of the Manhattan Company. In 1799, New York State granted
a corporate charter to Aaron Burr for the establishment of a company to
provide New York City with a safe water supply." 185 In addition to the
water works, the charter also allowed Burr to establish a bank to finance
the water works. "The Bank of the Manhattan Company was formed and
became the largest bank in the city as well as the state, and survives today
as Chase Manhattan Bank."186 The Manhattan Company continued to
sell water and engage in banking throughout most of the nineteenth
century.187
In addition, many individuals held, and still hold, controlling shares in
both banks and commercial firms. 8 8 In the nineteenth century, the
banker-industrialists Thomas Mellon and Moses Taylor each owned con-
trolling interests in banks and a variety of commercial enterprises. 189 In
fact, Sam Walton of Wal-Mart was the chief executive and principal
shareholder of Northwest Arkansas Bancshares, a BHC.190 Directors on
the boards of major U.S. banks are often affiliated with a broad range of
corporations.191
78, 1999); see also FDIC, MANDATE FOR CHANGE, supra note 140, at 98; Haubrich & San-
tos, supra note 3, at 121.
181. See FDIC, MANDATE FOR CHANGE, supra note 140, at 98. The study also argues
that restriction on bank activities and affiliations, such as the Glass-Steagall Act and the
BHC Act, should be abolished. Id. at 99-100.
182. Haubrich & Santos, supra note 3, at 128.
183. Id. at 127-28.
184. Id.
185. FDIC, MANDATE FOR CHANGE, supra note 140, at 24.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. "In the nineteen [sic] century, for example, Moses Taylor owned controlling inter-
ests in the National City Bank (a forerunner of Citibank) . . . [as well as] a mercantile
house, a gas utility and an iron company. Thomas Mellon started a private bank in Pitts-
burgh in the mid-nineteenth century and by the turn of the century the Mellon family
owned controlling interests in Mellon National Bank, Gulf Oil, Alcoa Aluminum and vari-
ous other industrial enterprises." Haubrich & Santos, supra note 3, at 155. For additional
examples of investors that have had controlling interests in both banks and commercial
firms simultaneously, see Huertas, supra note 1, at 744.
189. Huertas, supra note 1, at 744. For other examples, see Haubrich & Santos, supra
note 3, at 155.
190. See FDIC, MANDATE FOR CHANGE, supra note 140, at 19; see also Haubrich &
Santos, supra note 3, at 155-56.
191. See Haubrich & Santos, supra note 3, at 131, 155-56.
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The Glass-Steagall Act (GSA),1 92 which formally initiated a legal sepa-
ration between banking and commerce in the United States, was a re-
sponse to the Great Depression and the perception that banks with ties to
corporations were too powerful and that these relationships led to the
crash.193 Many scholars have challenged this assertion.194 Studies have
shown that most of the abuses that arose during the 1920s appear to have
reflected conflicts of interest pertaining to dealings with outside parties
rather than transactions with banks and their affiliates, which is the aim
of the GSA. 195 Increased oversight of the financial sector could have ad-
dressed the problems that led to the Great Depression without resorting
to comprehensive activity restrictions. The FDIC observed:
Until the 1930s, the securities affiliates of banks were not regulated,
examined, or in any way restricted in the activities in which they
could participate. Not surprisingly, abuses occurred. A certain de-
gree of supervision and regulation and some restrictions on affiliate
powers would have contributed significantly toward eliminating the
types of abuses that occurred during this period.196
The GSA, which was enthusiastically accepted by Congress as the na-
tion was reeling from the Great Depression, was based on fears of what
could happen rather than a direct response to what actually did happen.
Nevertheless, the Act's passage marks the beginning of a formal separa-
tion between banking and commerce in the United States.197 The target
of the GSA is the activities that can be conducted within a bank.198 The
Act does not allow banks to engage in commercial activities.199 This sep-
aration still guides our banking laws today even though our system of
banking would be practically unrecognizable to the regulators of the
192. The Glass-Steagall Act (named after its congressional sponsors, Senator Carter
Glass and Congressman Henry Steagall) is found in the Banking Act of 1933 §§ 16, 20, 21,
32 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 24, 78, 377, 378 (1988)).
193. See Janet A. Broeckel, Regulation of Bank Holding Companies' State Bank Subsid-
iaries That Engage in Nonbanking Activities: An Unjustified Extension of the Federal Re-
serve Board's Regulatory Power, 4 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 169, 171-73 (1990). The GSA was
enacted because of concerns about the risky behavior of commercial banks, such as "buy-
ing, selling, and underwriting questionably sound securities." Id. at 173 n.23; see also
Haubrich & Santos, supra note 3, at 133.
194. See FDIC, MANDATE FOR CHANGE, supra note 140, at ix ("It was demonstrated
long ago, and in a convincing fashion, that the Great Depression in no way resulted from
the common ownership of commercial and investment banking firms. The Glass-Steagall
Act was largely the result of efforts by Senator Carter Glass, who was guided in his efforts
by his belief in the discredited 'real-bills' doctrine."). For an explanation of the Real-Bills
doctrine, see FDIC, MANDATE FOR CHANGE, supra note 140, at 44 ("Scholars have studied
the record with great care since 1933. There is little or no evidence that the investment
banking activities of commercial bank affiliates were a major cause of bank failures. To the
extent that securities investments were a factor in bank failures, it was because of liquidity
problems rather than credit-quality concerns. It is hard to imagine banks not having li-
quidity problems in the face of massive bank runs and no backup liquidity support, regard-
less of the types of earning assets in their portfolios.").
195. See FDIC, MANDATE FOR CHANGE, supra note 140, at 44.
196. Id. at ix.
197. Broeckel, supra note 193, at 172.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 172 n.22.
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1930s.200 The GSA, however, did half the job of separating banking and
commerce because it only applied to banks, but not to holding compa-
nies. 2 0 1 That did not change until the 1950s.202
Congress extended the separation of banking and commerce initiated
by the passage of the GSA to restrictions on the activities of owners of
banks through the 1956 BHC Act and its 1966 and 1970 Amendments. 203
By most accounts, the BHC Act was aimed at the expansion of one cor-
poration, Transamerica, and its principal aim was to prevent conglomera-
tion in banking.204 Transamerica Corporation was formed in 1930 and
was structured as a holding company that owned many types of busi-
nesses, including banks, real estate, insurers, mortgagees, and even com-
mercial fishing companies. 2 0 5  Transamerica wanted to create a
nationwide bank, but the BHC Act, which prohibits any company that
controls a bank from engaging in any non-banking or commercial activi-
ties, prevented this action.206 The BHC Act initiated and completed the
restrictions on ownership of banks by commercial firms. Scholars often
cite the need to control expansion as the primary cause of the BHC
Act.2 0 7 Supporters of the BHC Act point out the potential for abuse
when the same owner controls both banking and commercial firms; how-
ever, when BHCs were unregulated, there was little evidence of such
abuse. 208 The real concern seemed to be that BHCs were seen as a threat
to the existence of small unit banks.2 0 9
Congress viewed the separation of banking and commerce through the
BHC Act as a way to prevent the concentration of power. 2 1 0 When Con-
200. Banks used to serve as the only source of credit. In our current securitized market,
there are many sources for financing and banks compete with other credit markets such as
the capital markets and commercial paper. See FDIC, MANDATE FOR CHANGE, supra note
140, at 6-7.
201. Broeckel, supra note 193, at 173.
202. Haubrich & Santos, supra note 3, at 140.
203. See Daniel R. Fischel et al., The Regulation of Banks and Bank Holding Compa-
nies, 73 VA. L. REV. 301, 319 (1987).
204. See FDIC, MANDATE FOR CHANGE, supra note 140, at 36-50. "[I]n 1948 ... [t]he
Federal Reserve Board charged that Transamerica was in violation of the Clayton Anti-
trust Act by monopolizing commercial banking in [several states]. Id. at 31. "At that time,
Transamerica controlled 46 banks, in addition to owning a large percentage of Bank of
America." Id. "In 1952, the Board ordered Transamerica to divest itself of all its bank
stock, except for Bank of America, within two years." Id. A Court of Appeals "[set] aside
the Board's decision in 1953 [and decided that] [u]nder the Clayton Act . . . 'the Board
failed to demonstrate that Transamerica's acquisitions substantially lessened competition
among the acquired banks."' Id.
205. J. Nellie Liang & Donald T. Savage, The Nonbank Activities of Bank Holding
Companies, 76 FED. REG. BULL. 280, 280 n.1, 281 (1990).
206. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, ch. 240, §§ 2-11, 70 Stat. 133-46 (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1843 (1988)). The Act also forces BHCs to divest of all interests in
companies that are not considered banks under the BHC Act. Id. at §1843(a)(2).
207. See Liang & Savage, supra note 205, at 280; Fischel et al., supra note 203.
208. See Fischel et al., supra note 203, at 320; see FDIC, MANDATE FOR CHANGE, supra
note 140, at 31.
209. For an explanation of the origins of the BHCA, see Liang & Savage, supra note
205, at 280-81. See also Fischel et al., supra note 203, at 331.
210. Liang & Savage, supra note 205, at 280-81.
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gress first passed the BHC Act, it exempted companies that held only one
bank from the activity restrictions placed on companies that owned two
or more banks. 211 Congress felt that the threat was contained in large
multibank conglomerates and that, because most one-bank holding com-
panies were small, they did not pose a problem.212 However, in the three
years after the passage of the 1966 Amendment, one-bank holding com-
panies grew substantially and became the holders of some of the nation's
largest banks.213 Consequently, Congress amended the BHC Act in 1970
to bring one-bank holding companies under its supervision and, thus, ini-
tiated a complete restriction on commercial ownership of banks for the
first time in U.S. history. 214 In explaining the passage of the 1970
Amendment, Congress conceded:
In making this decision, the committee wishes to note its agree-
ment with all of the Government regulatory agencies who testified
that there have been no major abuses effectuated through the one-
bank holding company device. It is clearly understood that the legis-
lation is to prevent possible future problems rather than to solve ex-
isting ones. 215
U.S. firms have attempted to circumvent the BHC Act's restrictions
since its imposition.216 Banks have tried to expand the definition of what
business activities the BHC Act considers related to banking and, thus,
permissible. 217 Each time, however, the legislature responded by narrow-
ing the definition of what activities are considered "incidental" to bank-
ing2 18 and finally issued a specific list of permissible bank activities. 219
Commercial firms bypassed the limitations of the BHC Act by establish-
ing nonbank type entities that had one element of the banking definition
but not the other.220 Thus, companies were essentially using nonbank
banks as a means of merging commerce and banking to meet the de-
mands of their complex business operations.221 Congress will either need
211. Id. at 281.
212. FDIC, MANDATE FOR CHANGE, supra note 140, at 32; see also S. REP. No. 84-
1095, at 1 (1955), reprinted in 1956 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2482, 2482 ("[P]ublic welfare requires the
enactment of legislation providing Federal regulation of the growth of bank holding com-
panies and the type of assets it is appropriate for such companies to control.").
213. Haubrich & Santos, supra note 3, at 144.
214. See Johnson & Kaufman, supra note 20, at 39.
215. S. Rep. No. 91-1084, at 3 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5519, 5522.
216. Haubrich & Santos, supra note 3, at 143.
217. Id. at 150.
218. The Garn-St. Germain Act narrowed the scope of what is considered banking.
Lloyd, supra note 94, at 213 (citing Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982,
Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469 (1982) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C.)).
219. For a comprehensive overview of U.S. banking law and the list of non-banking
activities allowed by the Board, see A.M. POLLARD ET AL., BANKING LAW IN THE UNITED
STATEs 272-88 (2d ed. 1988).
220. Haubrich & Santos, supra note 3, at 147-49. "By late 1986, there had been appli-
cations for about 400 charters for nonbank banks submitted to the Comptroller of the
Currency." Id. at 147.
221. Paul Volcker, Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
at the time, testified before the Senate Banking Committee: "Essentially, the nonbank
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to recognize these loopholes or loosen the BHC Act's restrictions on
banking activities.
Supporters of the BHC Act and the restrictions on commercial firm
ownership of banks claim that the separation ensures the overall safety of
banking. First, there are concerns that when banks and commercial firms
affiliate, conflicts of interest will occur. 2 2 2 Second, proponents argue that
unfair competition will result from the mixture. 223 Third, there are fears
that financial and economic monopolies or conglomerates will be created
that would foreclose competition.224 Fourth, some individuals are con-
cerned with the extension of the federal safety net to a commercial entity
that a banking authority does not supervise. 2 2 5 Fifth, there is concern
that the systemic risk increases when banking and commerce are
mixed.2 2 6 In the following section, I will explore each of these arguments
in more depth.
a. Conflicts of Interest
Critics of the ILC state that the mixing of banking and commerce
would "add to the potential for increased conflicts of interest and raise
the risk that insured institutions may engage in anticompetitive or un-
sound practices." 227 Another fear is that banks affiliated with commer-
cial firms may lend to their affiliates at much more preferable rates than
other entities. 228 There is certainly potential for conflicts and abuse in
many commercial and financial relationships.
Conflicts of interest already exist in commercial banks, among the dif-
ferent types of activities conducted by securities firms, and many other
industries. 2 2 9 Conflicts of interest also abound in many types of commer-
cial and financial enterprises. For example, there is a conflict of interest
within many banks due to a security firm's role as an "impartial" invest-
ment advisor and its role as a promoter of investment products. Automo-
bile dealers with service departments are in a position to misrepresent to
their customers the condition of their cars in order to perform unneces-
bank has become a device for tearing down the separation of commerce and banking by
permitting a commercial firm to enter the traditional banking business without abiding by
the provisions of the Bank Holding Company Act." Volcker, supra note 176, at 200.
222. GAO REPORT, supra note 10, at 72; see also ICBA Testimony, supra note 176, at
39; Kohn Testimony, supra note 51, at 24; Wilmarth, supra note 25, at 1549-50.
223. See Featherstone, supra note 90 (posing the question as to whether Wal-Mart
would lend money to its direct competitors and the potential effects on the proposed bank
if Wal-Mart goes bust); see also Raskovich, supra note 44, at 3.
224. See generally Jones Statement, supra note 14; Terry J. Jorde, President and CEO of
CountryBank USA, FDIC Symposium, The Future of Banking: The Structure and Role of
Commercial Affiliations (July 16, 2003), available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/conferences/
futurejordespeech.html.
225. Jorde, supra note 224.
226. See Wilmarth, supra note 25, at 1543.
227. GAO REPORT, supra note 10, at 72; see also ICBA Testimony, supra note 176, at
39-40; Kohn Testimony, supra note 51, at 12-13; Wilmarth, supra note 25, at 1549-50.
228. Kohn Testimony, supra note 51, at 128.
229. Haubrich & Santos, supra note 3, at 138 (discussing conflicts of interest of bank
directors with trust clients).
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sary repairs or sell new cars. Real estate brokers face a conflict between
their own interests to sell a property versus the seller's interest in secur-
ing the largest purchase price. However, banks and commercial firms can
plausibly create internal separation between their commercial and bank-
ing activities.230 In all of these enterprises, increasing disclosure and pun-
ishment for false or misleading statements could eliminate a conflict.
Accordingly, regulators should eliminate informational asymmetries and
increase oversight, supervision, and penalties for breach before an activ-
ity or affiliation is prohibited. These restrictions on ownership of banks
came before any abuse or failed attempt at regulation instead of being
imposed after abuses occurred and regulation was proven to be inade-
quate.231 Before activity restriction, it needs to be demonstrated that ex-
isting controls are insufficient to prevent these types of conflicts of
interest abuse in ILCs.2 3 2 In the limited world of ILCs, there is evidence
that such abuses have not occurred. Affiliations between commercial
firms and banks have not resulted in any failures due to conflicts of inter-
est or self-dealing of any kind in the time that ILCs have been owned by
commercial parents. 233
However, there is still a risk of potential abuse, and the risk of abuse
arising from a conflict of interest is greatest when an affiliate is in danger
of failing. For instance, when an affiliate needs substantial aid, an affili-
ate could force a bank to offer aid at the expense of its own solvency.
The argument follows that an ILC would come to the aid of its commer-
cial affiliates, or vice-versa, and each firm would risk its own safety to
protect its affiliate, resulting in a conflict of interest. However, history
does not support this fear. In the 1970s when rising interest rates
threatened many bank-sponsored Real Estate Investment Trusts
230. Note that Michael Lewis contends in "The Big Short" that these so-called "Chi-
nese Walls" that were supposed to function as barriers between different departments in
large investment banks were not effective in the least. MICHAEL LEWIS, THE BIG SHORT:
INSIDE THE DOOMSDAY MACHINE 204-05 (2010). However, it seems that the situations
that led to the breaking of these "barriers" were ripe for abuse and unlike the relationship
between a commercial parent and its banking subsidiary.
231. See FDIC, MANDATE FOR CHANGE, supra note 140, at 44 (noting that Congress
made no attempt in the 1930s to test the effect of regulation and supervision before man-
dating an outright prohibition).
232. Donald Powell's remarks before Congress note the effectiveness of FDIC supervi-
sory practices and also note that the FDIC has "found parent companies of ILCs to be
acutely conscious of their responsibilities with respect to their ILC subsidiaries and the
consequences of violating applicable laws and regulations." Powell Remarks, supra note
158. After an extensive study in the 1980s of the potential for conflict, the FDIC con-
cluded: "Despite the widespread potential for abuse, there is little to suggest that conflict-
of-interest abuse in the U.S. economy is at an unacceptable level. Those who make such
claims bear the burden of proof, but they have presented no such proof . . . . Without
evidence to the contrary, one must conclude that existing controls are adequate to prevent
excessive conflict-of interest abuse. Nowhere is this more true than in the banking indus-
try." See FDIC, MANDATE FOR CHANGE, supra note 140, at 46; see also DEP'T OF THE
TREASURY, MODERNIZING THE FIN. SYSTEM: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SAFER, MORE
COMPETITIVE BANKS 29-36, 46-48 (1991); MUCKENFUSS & EAGER, supra note 157, at 57
n.36 (citing Rose Marie Kushmeider, The U.S. Federal Financial Regulatory System: Re-
structuring Federal Bank Regulation, 17 FDIC BANKING REv. 4, 13-15 (2005)).
233. See infra notes 363-67 and accompanying text.
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(REITs), the banks that sponsored them came to their aid in many
cases. 2 3 4 Regulators could have tried to discourage such activity, but in
fact, the Federal Reserve supported and encouraged efforts by banks to
save their REITs.2 3 5 It is noteworthy, however, that not a single bank
failed as a result of aid given to REITs.2 3 6 Although there may be some
incentives for banks to aid associated or affiliated firms, "there is no evi-
dence from the REIT experience that the incentive is so great that a bank
is willing to go down with the ship."2 3 7 Several ILC owners have also
experienced bankruptcy without resorting to taking funds from their
ILCs.238
The fear that banks would make favorable loans to their affiliates also
ignores the fact that preferential lending is illegal and that violators face
severe penalties. This type of conflict is certainly a source of concern and
could endanger a bank, but it is the exact conduct addressed by Sections
23A and 23B of the Federal Reserve Act, which limit transactions be-
tween a bank and its affiliates. 2 3 9 Similarly, section 23B of the Federal
Reserve Act requires that any transaction between a bank and its affili-
ates needs to be "on terms and conditions, including credit standards, that
are substantially the same, or at least as favorable to [the bank] as those
prevailing at the time for comparable transactions" with unaffiliated
companies." 240
Despite these safeguards, abuses may occur, and regulators must vigi-
lantly supervise banks to deter these types of offenses. 2 41 Fraud and
234. FDIC, MANDATE FOR CHANGE, supra note 140, at 78.
235. Id. at 117 (citing Anthony Cornyn et al., An Analysis of the Concept of Corporate
Separateness in BHC Regulation From an Economic Perspective, in PROCEEDINGS OF A
CONFERENCE ON BANK STRUCTURE AND COMPETITION (Fed. Res. Bank of Chi., 1986).
236. Id.
237. See FDIC, MANDATE FOR CHANGE, supra note 140, at 118. This article also ana-
lyzes seven different situations where a safe wall was erected between an ailing bank and
its bank holding company and the failure did not cause any loss to the FDIC insurance
fund or danger to the bank. Id. at 118-24. The FDIC concludes that "effective insulation
is possible . . . . Subsidiaries and affiliates can be protected against legal risks if certain
procedures are followed to ensure that the operations are conducted in truly separate cor-
porate entities . . . . [N]ew powers can be granted to banking organizations, with appropri-
ate safeguards to ensure that the banking system remains safe and sound." Id. at 127.
238. See infra Part III.B.2.e and accompanying notes.
239. 12 U.S.C. § 371c(a)(2) (2008). There are also strict collateral requirements on any
transactions between an ILC and its parent. See 12 U.S.C. § 371c(b)(E) (2008); see also
§ 371c(a)(1)(A)-(B) (stating that covered transactions with a single affiliate may not ex-
ceed 10% of the bank's capital and surplus and such transactions with all affiliates may not
exceed 20% of the bank's capital and surplus).
240. 12 U.S.C. § 371c (1982), amended by Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987,
12 U.S.C.A. § 371c-1 (1987).
241. CAMDEN R. FINE, U.S. Households & The Mixing of Banking & Commerce, in
THE MIXING OF BANKING & COMMERCE, supra note 157, at 28, 31. Camden Fine ex-
presses doubt about the effectiveness of firewalls: "In my view, regulatory 'firewalls' are
like the French Maginot line, they are a monument to the folly of man. There is always a
Rommel (or in our present context Keating, Lay, or Ebbers) that will devise a way
around." See also ILCs-A Review of Charter, Ownership, and Supervision Issues: Hear-
ing Before the H. Subcomm. on Fin. Institutions and Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on
Fin. Servs., 109th Cong. 43 (2006) (statement of Rep. Barney Frank, Member, H. Comm.
on Fin. Servs.) ("A lot of things have been dealt with by statute but, you know, you heard
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abuse can occur despite the most comprehensive regulatory safeguards
and oversight. With mixed results, Congress and the banking agencies
have attempted to develop a strong and effective regime for protecting
insured banks from abuse by insiders or affiliates.242 There is certainly
room for improvement in banking regulation in general. However, when
there are laws designed to prevent abuse from conflicts of interest and
there are regulators responsible for enforcing these laws, prohibiting
commercial firms from owning banks because of the potential for a con-
flict of interest undermines regulators' abilities to control abuse.
As a 2005 FDIC study examining potential conflicts of interest
concludes:
On examination, the principal potential conflicts that are offered as a
rationale for separating banking and commerce seem unlikely to
pose significant risks to the safety and soundness of the bank or to
the federal safety net . . . . [M]ost conflict situations affecting banks
can be controlled through the supervisory process and enforcement
of the appropriate firewalls and need not pose excessive risk to
banks or the banking system.2 4 3
b. Unfair Competition
Opponents of the ILC assert that
[t]he ILC exception fosters an unfair and unlevel competitive and
regulatory playing field by allowing firms that acquire an insured
ILC in a handful of states to operate outside the activity restrictions
and consolidated supervisory and regulatory framework that apply
to other community-based, regional and diversified organizations
that own a . .. bank.2 4 4
Community banks, fearing that Wal-Mart will have an adverse effect
on community banking, are the most vocal group opposing the ILC.2 4 5
The Independent Community Bankers of America (ICBA) testified that
some commercial firms that have applied for an ILC "have the size and
resources to engage in predatory pricing for as long as it takes to drive
the local competitors out of the market." 246 They claim that Wal-Mart
will use its size and market dominance to undercut prices and drive com-
about the statute of limitations. I'm going to give you a new concept-a limitation of
statutes. Just because it's in the statutes doesn't mean that it's going to happen."); Wil-
marth, supra note 25, at 1596 (stating that firewalls break down in times of financial stress).
242. See MUCKENFUss & EAGER, supra note 157, at 47 (challenging the "assumption
that commercial firms manage their business with less care for legal compliance and sound
management principles than BHCs").
243. Christine E. Blair, The Future of Banking in America, The Mixing of Banking and
Commerce: Current Policy Issues, 16 FDIC BANKING REV. No. 4, 97, 104 (2004).
244. Scott Alvarez, General Counsel, Fed. Reserve Bd., Testimony Before the S.
Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs (Oct. 4, 2007).
245. See ICBA Testimony, supra note 176, at 38-40; see also Letter from Greenville
Community Bank to John F. Carter, Reg'l Dir. of FDIC (Sept. 20, 2005); Letter from Mark
Nowak, Senior Lender, Farmers State Bank, to John F. Carter, Reg'1 Dir. of FDIC (Sept.
19, 2005).
246. ICBA Testimony, supra note 76, at 39 n.40.
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munity banks out of business. 2 4 7 For several decades, community bank-
ers have directed this fear of "bigness" towards banking organizations
due to the "special" nature of banks and their centrality to the country's
financial system.248 This fear was especially prevalent in the years imme-
diately following World War II possibly because the popular feeling at
that time was that close ties between banking and industry in the Axis
Powers facilitated the events that led to the war.2 4 9
It is important to distinguish between unfair and fair competition-the
latter being good for the market and the former damaging.250 In a paper
written for the Department of Justice Economic Analysis Group, Alexan-
der Raskovich analyzed the Herfindahl-Hirshmann Index, a common
measure of market concentration, to determine whether the mixing of
banking and commerce would lead to any market foreclosure or monop-
oly concerns.251 The study concludes that "so long as commercial rivals
have good alternative sources of credit, concerns with 'competitive ine-
quality' in lending are misplaced." 2 5 2 Raskovich states that even in a ru-
ral banking situation where banks are more concentrated, vertical
integration, or the affiliation of a bank and a commercial firm, is unlikely
to lead to attempts to foreclose rivals.2 5 3 He also notes that banks are no
more vulnerable to market foreclosure than many other industries stat-
ing, "[i]n comparison with many other industries, banking appears neither
exceptionally concentrated nor unusually susceptible to foreclosure
risks." 2 5 4
In addition, the changes in the U.S. banking system over the last dec-
ade weaken these anti-competitive fears. U.S. banking has seen incredi-
ble growth and expansion due to the 1994 Reigle-Neal Interstate
Branching Statute, which has expanded the ability of banks to expand
across state lines, making national banking much easier and allowing
banks to "shop" for competitive state regulations and rates.2 5 5 Moreover,
internet and communications advances have made fundamental changes
to the banking industry and allowed for many additional banking players
to enter the finance and credit market, formerly dominated by traditional
247. Id.
248. See generally Corrigan, supra note 140.
249. See FDIC, MANDATE FOR CHANGE, supra note 140, at 1-14.
250. Considering Wal-Mart's past practices, a Wal-Mart national bank could certainly
have a damaging effect on small banks across the U.S. However, if regulators decided to
limit Wal-Mart's expansion into national banking, they could do so without disrupting a
successful and safe industry and without using Wal-Mart as a stand-in for the larger debate
about the mixing of banking and commerce.
251. Raskovich, supra note 44, at 4.
252. Id. at 3.
253. Id. at 5.
254. Id. at 6.
255. Reigle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-328, 108 Stat. 2338 (1994) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1831u(a)(1)) (permitting BHCs to
acquire control of out-of-state banks regardless of state law prohibitions and allowing in-
terstate branching by foreign and domestic BHCs).
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banks.256 These changes have reduced barriers to entry for many small
banks and have allowed for banks to compete for customers through the
internet. ILCs would only increase healthy competition in the banking
sector by allowing new entrants to enter banking. Although advances
have allowed increased competition, the banking sector is becoming in-
creasingly dominated by a small number of large and powerful banks that
have been backed by funds from the federal government. 257 Small- and
mid-sized banks have become more vulnerable because they are not "too
big to fail." 258 Experts predict that this conglomeration will continue and
accelerate as the banking crisis continues and small banks can no longer
survive.259 The funding structure of ILCs provides a way for small- and
medium-sized banks to survive with backing from a commercial parent
rather than from the federal government.
As noted, fears of unfair competition most likely center on the threat
of a hypothetical "Wal-Mart national bank." 260 In fact, Wal-Mart has al-
ready entered into some forms of banking without any major conse-
quences to its banking competitors.261 Wal-Mart has been marketing the
debit card for the past few years and has also been offering money trans-
fer services, check cashing services, and money orders at significantly
lower prices than its competitors. 262 Wal-Mart stores process about one
million financial transactions a week.2 6 3 There is no indication that Wal-
Mart is pricing Western Union or its other competitors out of business.
Wal-Mart has a potential banking customer base different than tradi-
tional retail banks. Analysts have estimated that about one-fifth of Wal-
Mart customers do not have bank accounts, a ratio twice the national
rate. 2 64 Consequently, Wal-Mart could have a positive effect on U.S.
banking by targeting the "underbanked" and "unbanked" and providing
them with much-needed financial services, such as bank accounts and fi-
nancing. Consumers would benefit from a Wal-Mart bank because Wal-
Mart could provide banking services at lower prices to a largely over-
256. THOMAS F. HUERTAS, The Mixing of Banking & Commerce: The Union of Bank-
ing and Commerce-A Bridge Too Far, or Just Another Turn in the Road?, in THE MIXING
OF BANKING & COMMERCE, supra note 157, at 62, 62.
257. See Arthur Wilmarth, The Dark Side of Universal Banking: Financial Conglomer-
ates and the Origins of the Subprime Financial Crisis, 41 CONN. L. REV. 963, 963-1050
(2009).
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Joe Adler, Review 2007/Preview 2008: ILC Bill's Prospects Wane as Sense of Ur-
gency Fades, AM. BANKER, Dec. 31, 2007, at 1. George Sutton, the Utah representative for
the ILC industry, argues however, "industrial banks have made it clear that they would
agree to a prohibition on branching by a commercially owned industrial bank.. . . That
essentially precludes Wal-Mart from doing what everybody was afraid they would do in the
future." Id.
261. Garver, supra note 94, at 1.
262. Id.; see also Weston, supra note 50 (noting, for example, that for a wire transfer to
Mexico, Wal-Mart charges $10 compared to $14.99 at Western Union).
263. Weston, supra note 50.
264. Id.
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looked clientele. 265 For example, Wal-Mart has been providing the same
banking services that it provided to their employees to a low-income,
largely Hispanic population not served by traditional banks.266
A Wal-Mart bank could be large and competitive without being unfair
or unsafe, and it could be an adequate competitor to the large banks that
currently have the majority of the market power in our banking sys-
tem.267 In fact, it seems to be the fear of fair competition driving some of
the opposition to ILCs. Lawrence White testified before Congress:
The executives of small banks have a history of claiming dire conse-
quences every time a state legislature contemplated allowing ex-
panded intra-state branching privileges . . . . [D]espite the
consolidation, [however,] thousands of new (de novo) banks have
been formed over the past few decades, as enterprising bankers have
seen and embraced new business opportunities, often in the wake of
mergers. . . . A similar pattern could be expected if an expanded
Wal-Mart bank were to leave the financial needs of groups of cus-
tomers unfulfilled. America's bankers may not like the competition;
but they are creative and resourceful, and most will survive. 268
c. Fear of Conglomerates and Monopolies
The fear of monopolies has been an argument against the mixing of
banking and commerce since the start of banking and has "great populist
appeal." 269 Critics fear that the "mixing of banking and commerce could
promote the formation of very large conglomerate enterprises with sub-
stantial amounts of economic power. If these institutions were able to
dominate some markets, such as the banking market in a particular local
area, they could impact the access to bank services and credit for custom-
265. See Michael Barbaro & Eric Dash, At Wal-Mart, a Back Door Into Banking, N.Y.
TIMES, June 21, 2007, at C1.
266. THOMAS FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD Is FLAT: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY 161-62 (2007).
267. Wilmarth, supra note 257, at 963-1050 (stating that banking has experienced a
massive conglomeration as a result of current banking crisis and that a few large and pow-
erful firms now control the majority of market share).
268. White Testimony, supra note 48, at 219; see also Powell Remarks, supra note 158
("Many worry about competition in the future that may come from new entrants into the
ILC environment. I understand these fears. After all, I was a community banker once and
I know all too well the pressures these institutions feel every day .... [W]hile I understand
the anxiety some people have on this issue, fear of competition should not be the compel-
ling argument in formulating good public policy.").
269. "[This argument] can be traced back at least to Andrew Jackson's 'war' in the
1830s against the Second Bank of the United States, and elements of the argument were
already present in the debates concerning the chartering of the nation's first banks during
the late 18th and early 19th centuries." Huertas, supra note 1, at 748. For modem argu-
ments focused on the fear of a concentration of power, see JAMES LEACH, The Mixing of
Commerce and Banking, in THE MIXING OF BANKING & COMMERCE, supra note 157, at 13,
18 ("fundamentally what is at issue is a concentration of power"). See also FINE, supra
note 241, at 29 ("That nagging doubt in the back of everyone's mind over missing banking
and commerce is our collective culture's deep distrust of concentrated power in any one or
few hands.").
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ers in those markets." 270 Although concern with power concentration is
legitimate, addressing such concerns through limiting activities or restrict-
ing affiliations is "a blunt instrument approach" that denies the competi-
tive benefit of new entrants into the system.271 Thomas Huertas
addressed this contention when it arose two decades ago:
It is instructive to note that in the bank war of the 1830s, great num-
bers won out over great size, and that generally remains the rule in
politics today. Fears that free entry into financial services would re-
sult in excessive political power seem overdrawn. . . . Any law that
restricts entry confers wealth on the people owning the entities that
are protected from competition, and this tends to create a constitu-
ency in favor of the law. 2 7 2
Other scholars have also criticized the assertion that the mixing of
banking and commerce would lead to large conglomerates with excessive
economic power.273 Given the structure of our economy and our anti-
trust laws, they feel that this argument is misplaced.274 Competition from
outsiders into the banking market can be beneficial to customers, espe-
cially to those underserved by existing banks. It is interesting to examine
the critiques against conglomerates given our current economic climate
where banks have been forced to join together either by federal mandate
or by market pressure, a process that has saved many banks from col-
lapse. 27 5 In the last year, the banking sector has seen an unprecedented
rate of conglomeration among BHCs.2 7 6 Many small banks have failed,
and large banks have joined together to seek stability.277 This is ironi-
cally a result of the BHC Act, which was formed to prevent conglomera-
tion.2 7 8 Banks have been forced to merge with one another because of
capital and stability concerns, and due to the BHC Act restrictions, they
can only join other banks or bank holding companies, causing a conglom-
eration in banking.279
270. GAO REPORT, supra note 10, at 72-73; see also Kohn Testimony, supra note 51, at
128 ("Congress expressed concern that allowing banks and commercial firms to affiliate
with each other could lead to the concentration of economic power in a few very large
conglomerates.").
271. MUCKENFUSs & EAGER, supra note 157, at 52.
272. Huertas, supra note 1, at 748 (citing George G. Stigler, The Theory of Economic
Regulation, 1 BELL J. ECON. MGMT. Sci. 3-21 (1971)).
273. See generally Nisreen H. Darwish & Douglas D. Evanoff, The Mixing of Banking
and Commerce: A Conference Summary, CHI. FED. LETTER, Nov. 2007, available at http://
www.chicagofed.org/digital-assets/publications/chicago-fed_1etter/2007/cflnovember2007
244a.pdf.
274. Id.
275. JP Morgan Chase was forced to buy Bear Stearns; Barclays bought some of Leh-
man, JPMorgan Chase bought Washington Mutual, Wells Fargo bought Wachovia, etc. See
generally SOS: 'Save Our Stocks' A Look Back at a Year of Bailouts, Underwater Investors
and Sunken Hopes, WALL ST. J., Jan. 2, 2009, at R9-R11.
276. FDIC Failed Bank List, FDIC, http://www.fdic.gov/banklindividuallfailed/ban-
klist.html (last visited Oct. 13, 2010).
277. See Eric Dash, Failures of Small Banks Grow, Straining F.D.I.C., N.Y. TIMEs, Oct.
11, 2009, at Al; SOS, supra note 275, at R9-R11.
278. See MELANIE L. FEIN, SECURITIEs AcrlITES OF BANKs 2-42 (3d ed. 2001).
279. See id. at 2-42; SOS, supra note 275, at R9-R11.
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Although it is often assumed that conglomerates present a threat to
safe and fair banking, even before this current crisis, some have argued
that conglomerates can provide substantial economic benefits. 280 For ex-
ample, John Hawkes, former U.S. Comptroller of the Currency, stated
that, "conglomerate ownership of banking institutions particularly owner-
ship by financial conglomerates properly managed and appropriately reg-
ulated and supervised can provide opportunities for greater profitability,
can offer consumers significant advantages, and can add strength to the
financial system." 281 In addition, there is no reason to presume that
fewer large banks would lead to more failures than many small banks.
The 1987 and 2008 crises both led to many small banks failing, which had
a devastating effect on the entire economy.282 Notably, the Canadian
banking system, which has been one of the most healthy and resilient
during the recent financial collapse, is structured around a few large
banking conglomerates that are highly regulated and diversified. 283
Many have recently suggested that the U.S. structure should mimic that
of Canada and allow the nation's banks to form conglomerates to avoid
the failure of hundreds of small banks, as is currently anticipated.284
d. Extension of the Federal Safety Net
A principal concern in the mixing of banking and commerce is that it
extends to commercial firms the federal safety net that the government
designed specifically for banks. 285 This argument assumes that commer-
cial affiliations increase risk and that commercial firms are inherently
more risky and prone to failure than banks. There is little validity to this
point. In fact, it can be argued that it has been the banks that have taken
excessive risks because they have been taking risks with their investors
and depositors' money with the full backing of the FDIC insurance fund
and, ultimately, the protection of the Federal Reserve. 286
Still, critics argue that FDIC insurance would effectively act as a sub-
sidy to save a commercial parent if the ILC or its parent is deemed "too
big to fail." 287 Arthur Wilmarth, a vocal opponent of the ILC, recently
280. See generally John D. Hawke, Jr., Former U.S. Comptroller of the Currency, Re-
marks to the 16th Special Seminar on International Finance of the Japan Financial News
Co., Ltd. (Nov. 16, 2005).
281. Id.
282. Eric Lipton, F.D.LC. Raises Fees to Replenish Bank Fund, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 27,
2009) http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/28/us/politics/28web-banks.html.
283. See Paul Krugman, Op-Ed, Good and Boring, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2010, at A19;
Theresa Tedesco, Op-Ed, The Great Solvent North, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2009, at A23.
284. See Krugman, supra note 283, at A19; Tedesco, supra note 283, at A23.
285. See GAO REPORT, supra note 10, at 8; ICBA Testimony, supra note 176, at
99-101; Kohn Testimony, supra note 51, at 128; Jorde, supra note 224; Wilmarth, supra
note 257, at 1079.
286. PIERGIORGIo ALESSANDRI & ANDREw G. HALDANE, BANK OF ENGLAND, BANK-
ING ON THE STATE 8 (2009), available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/
speeches/2009/speech4O9.pdf (arguing that banks have an incentive to take risks and be
overleveraged because of the banking of the state).
287. A scenario often presented considers if Enron had an ILC. Emil Lee, First Bank
of Wal-Mart?, MOTLEY FOOL (Nov. 20, 2006), http://www.fool.com/investing/value/2006/11/
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made this argument in opposing using TARP funds to bail out GMAC. 2 8 8
He argues that the federal government's bailout of GMAC is an exten-
sion of the federal safety net to a nonfinancial industry.289 The argument
rests on the fear that because the FDIC is not the primary regulator of
the parent companies of financial firms, the FDIC "cannot monitor the
business practices of the commercial owner or its affiliates to reveal po-
tential risks to the soundness of the entire group or the ILC."290 Oppo-
nents assume that if there were a problem at the parent level, the FDIC
could not reach the parent, which would allow the bank to fail and lead to
FDIC insurance being used to protect the entire organization. 291 As pre-
viously discussed, the FDIC is armed with sufficient oversight and en-
forcement powers to prohibit certain ownership arrangements and to stop
harmful activities of ILC commercial parents.292 If there is a potential for
risk, the FDIC will prohibit bank ownership in the first place and, subse-
quently, take measures to reduce risk within a commercial-banking
affiliation. 293
In addressing this fear, it is important to consider the ILC structure and
its history of commercial ownership coupled with FDIC insured banks. A
review of the record demonstrates that FDIC funds have never been used
to help an ILC with a commercial parent.294 Throughout the history of
ILC existence, including the current financial crisis, not one commer-
cially-owned ILC has failed or caused even one dollar of loss to the FDIC
insurance fund. 2 9 5 As the nation's small and large banks are failing at a
dramatic rate, the lack of any ILC failures stands in sharp contrast to the
trend and testifies to the charter's stability. Consequently, ILCs do not
pose any more risk to the deposit fund than any other commercial firm.
The GAO Report concluded "from an operations standpoint, ILCs do
not appear to have a greater risk of failure than other types of insured
depository institutions." 2 9 6 Past failures of ILCs have not been caused by
their commercial affiliations but rather "from faulty strategic or tactical
decisions." 2 9 7
20/first-bank-of-walmart.aspx. See generally Consideration of Regulatory Reform Propos-
als: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 108th Cong.
338-40 (2004) (written testimony of Ed Mierzwinski, Director of Consumer Protection,
U.S. Public Interest Research Group & Margot Saunders, Managing Attorney, National
Consumer Law Center).
288. See generally Wilmarth, supra note 137.
289. Id.
290. Ergungor & Thomson, supra note 42.
291. Id.
292. See Blair, supra note 70, at 109.
293. Id.
294. See West, supra note 9, at 6-8.
295. Leary Testimony, supra note 19, at 191-92; see also Telephone Interview with Dar-
ryle Rude, Supervisor of Industrial Banks for the State of Utah (Dec. 2, 2009); Failed Bank
List, FDIC, http://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/failed/banklist.html (last visited Oct. 7,
2010).
296. GAO REPORT, supra note 10, at 24.
297. Blair, supra note 70, at 114.
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One study concludes that there would not be any significant trickling
out of FDIC funds to banking affiliates if banks were more integrated
with commercial firms.298 Moreover, the author states that it is likely that
"under the current regulatory regime much or all of any safety net sub-
sidy is already trickling out to commercial borrowers" because, in a com-
petitive industry, any reduction in cost is passed through to customers in
the form of lower prices.299
If policymakers want to eliminate the subsidy altogether, they could
reprice deposit insurance to take into effect the trickling out of the bene-
fit across the market. 300 Another measure to protect FDIC insurance
would be to establish cross-guarantee liability for commercial owners as
well as affiliates of ILCs, whereby the commercial owner and all of its
affiliates would have to pay any deposit insurance liabilities before any
money from the FDIC insurance fund is used.30'
Admittedly, ILCs are susceptible to all of the risks and mismanage-
ment of a parent commercial firm.302 Further, commercial activities
"provide a host of ways for [banks] to increase risk."303 For example, a
troubled bank could hide its poor assets on the books of a commercial
parent, or an ailing commercial parent could potentially cause the demise
of its affiliate bank. However, in over two decades of commercial owner-
ship of ILCs, this has not happened. 304 Commercial firms have failed
without affecting their ILCs largely due to effective regulation and regu-
latory firewalls.305
298. Raskovich, supra note 44, at 6-7.
299. Id. at 7.
300. Since deposit insurance does not base premiums on risk exposure, there is a need
to monitor and limit the risk-taking activities of insured banks. In the absence of such
oversight, the incentives created by mispricing may result in excessive losses to the insur-
ance fund. FDIC, MANDATE FOR CHANGE, supra note 140, at 109. For an analysis of the
problems facing the deposit insurance system, see Huertas, supra note 1, at 752-55.
301. Currently, the ILC owner is liable for losses, but affiliates of that owner are not.
Letter from Donald Powell, Chairman, FDIC, to Robert F. Bennett, U.S. Senate (Apr. 30,
2003), available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/conferences/futurebennett.html ("[a]s part of
the Federal Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIR-
REA), Congress established a system that generally permits the FDIC to assess liability
across commonly controlled institutions for FDIC losses caused by the default of one of
the institutions. Currently, cross-guarantee liability is limited to insured depository institu-
tions that are commonly controlled as defined in the statute. The definition of 'commonly
controlled' limits liability to insured depository institutions that are controlled by the same
depository institution holding company, i.e., either a bank holding company or a savings
and loan holding company. Since the parent company of an ILC is neither a bank holding
company nor a savings and loan holding company, ILCs that are owned by the same parent
company would not be 'commonly controlled.' As a result, cross-guarantee liability may
not attach to ILCs that are owned by the same parent company.").
302. Kohn Testimony, supra note 51, at 128; Raskovich, supra note 44, at 8.
303. John Krainer, The Separation of Banking and Commerce, ECON. REv. (Fed. Res.
Bank of San Fran.), Jan. 1, 2000, at 23.
304. See Leary Testimony, supra note 19, at 191-92.
305. Id.
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e. Systemic Risk and the Stability of the ILC Model
Most opponents of the ILC and the mixing of banking and commerce
claim that allowing commerce and banking to mix increases systemic risk
in the banking industry.306 Recent congressional testimony by America's
Community Bankers states: "These risks [of preferential lending and
other support for commercial affiliates], combined with the rapid growth
of ILCs create systemic risk concerns." 307 The GAO report claimed that
because ILCs have not been tested during a time of "economic stress," it
could still be assumed that they increased systemic risk.308 In the absence
of comprehensive studies to determine the systemic risk of ILCs, the cur-
rent crisis has served as an excellent "testing ground" for identifying risky
banking structures. The ILC industry has been vindicated through its
success and stability, while other banks have faltered by the hundreds.309
Recent and historic examples demonstrate that when a parent commer-
cial firm faces financial trouble and even bankruptcy, their ILCs do not
suffer.310 When Lehman Brothers Holding Inc. (Lehman Brothers)
failed, Ben Bernanke, Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Fed-
eral Reserve, stated that even if the Board of Governors wanted to save
the firm, they could not do so because the problems were too deep and
Lehman's pledged collateral was essentially worthless.311 Nevertheless,
when Lehman Brothers fell apart, their ILC remained sound.312 Darryle
Rude, the industrial bank supervisor for the Utah Department of Finan-
cial Institutions, explains:
306. The Industrial Bank Holding Company Act of 2007: Hearing on H.R. 698 Before
the H. Comm. on Financial Servs., 110th Cong. 84 (2007) (prepared statement of Arthur R.
Connelly, First Vice Chairman of America's Community Bankers).
307. MUCKENFUSS & EAGER, supra note 157, at 40, 55 n.7 (citing written Testimony of
America's Community Bankers on the Industrial Bank Holding Company Act of 2007
before the Committee on Financial Services of the U.S. House of Representatives (ILCs-
A Review of Charter, Ownership, and Supervision Issues: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm.
On Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit, 109th Cong. 9 (2006)).
308. See GAO REPORT, supra note 10, at 7 (stating that ILCs have "been refined dur-
ing a period of time described as the 'golden age of banking' and has not been tested
during a time of significant economic stress").
309. Failed Bank List; see also Lipton, supra note 282 (stating that more banks have
failed in the first quarter of 2009 than in 2008 and predicting that over 100 banks will fail in
2009).
310. See generally John Cassidy, Anatomy of a Meltdown: Ben Bernanke and the Finan-
cial Crisis, THE NEW YORKER, Dec. 1, 2008, available at http://www.newyorker.com/report-
ing/2008/12/01/081201fafact cassidy?currentpage=all.
311. Id. ("Remarkably, once the potential bidders dropped out, Bernanke and Paulson
never seriously considered mounting a government rescue of Lehman Brothers. Bernanke
and other Fed officials say that they lacked the legal authority to save the bank. 'There
was no mechanism, there was no option, there was no set of rules, there was no funding to
allow us to address that situation,' Bernanke said last month, at the Economic Club of New
York. 'The Federal Reserve's ability to lend, which was used in the Bear Stearns case, for
example, requires that adequate collateral be posted.. . . In this case, that was impossi-
ble-there simply wasn't enough collateral to support the lending.... With Bear Steams,
with all the others, there was a point when someone said, "Mr. Chairman, are we going to
do this deal or not?" With Lehman, we were never anywhere near that point. There
wasn't a decision to be made."'); see also infra note 313 and accompanying text.
312. See Cassidy, supra note 310.
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The industrial bank is very safe and sound. It is well capitalized and
liquid, and has very good earnings. While other banks have been suf-
fering over the last several quarters, Lehman Brothers Commercial
Bank actually has been performing very well . . . . We have lived
through this scenario before where a parent company has filed bank-
ruptcy, and the subsidiary bank was disposed of in an orderly
fashion.313
Since the bankruptcy, Lehman Brothers' ILC has converted to Wood-
lands Commercial Bank. Although, it faces struggles similar to most
banking institutions in the country, it is still operating. 314
Other prominent examples of situations where the bankruptcy of a par-
ent did not affect its ILC are Conseco, Inc. ("Conseco"), Tyco Interna-
tional Ltd. ("Tyco"), and more recently, Flying J, Inc. When Conseco
filed for bankruptcy, its ILC remained solvent and healthy. 315 In fact, the
Conseco ILC was sold for a profit in the orderly liquidation of the insur-
ance company. 316 As Tyco was failing, the state of Utah took control of
its ILC and sold it in an Initial Public Offering (IPO) without the ILC's
assets suffering any loss. 317 Tyco's former ILC was purchased by CIT
bank, and that bank also survived the failure of its parent company.318 A
more recent example is Flying J, Inc., which is the largest retailer of diesel
fuel in the West. 319 When the company entered Chapter 11 bankruptcy
due to fuel price fluctuations, its ILC, Transportation Alliance Bank, was
unaffected and its balance sheets remained strong. 320 The parent com-
pany, although in Chapter 11, remains a source of strength for the
bank.321
313. Joe Adler, What Moves Mean for I-Banks' Thrifts and ILCs, AM. BANKER, Sept.
16, 2008, at 3.
314. Patrick Fitzgerald, Lehman Seeks to Inject Cash to Save Banks from Regulators,
Dow JONES FINANCIAL INFORMATIONAL SERVICES, Feb. 12, 2009.
315. The following is the FDIC summary of the Conseco failure: "Despite the financial
troubles of its parent and the parent's subsequent bankruptcy . .. Conseco Bank's corpo-
rate firewalls and the regulatory supervision provided by Utah and the FDIC proved ade-
quate in ensuring the bank's safety and soundness. In fact, $323 million of the $1.04 billion
dollars received in the bankruptcy sale of Conseco Finance was in payment for the insured
ILC-Conseco Bank, renamed Mill Creek Bank-which was purchased by GE Capital.
As a testament to the Conseco Bank's financial health at the time of sale, the $323 million
was equal to the book value of the bank at year-end 2002." See Blair, supra note 70, at 114.
For the GAO's discussion of Conseco, see GAO REPORT, supra note 10, at 69.
316. Telephone Interview with Darryle Rude, Supervisor of Industrial Banks for the
State of Utah, (Jan. 28, 2009); see also Blair, supra note 70, at 114.
317. Leary Testimony, supra note 19, at 192.
318. Telephone Interview with Darryle Rude, supra note 316; see also Karen Shaw Pe-
trou, Special Cases: Parent Fails, Bank Lives, AM. BANKER, Nov. 11, 2009, at 9. This article
notes that the dissolution of the CIT and Capmark parent commercial firms and the sur-
vival of their banks is unprecedented. The article does not mention that the banks were
formerly ILCs, which I believe is the reason the seamless dissolution was possible.
319. See generally Company History of Flying J Inc., FUNDING UNIVERSE, http://
www.fundinguniverse.com/company-histories/Flying-J-Inc-Company-History.html (last vis-
ited July 22, 2010).
320. Telephone Interview with Darryle Rude, supra note 316.
321. Id.
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Not only have ILCs not suffered because of their failing parents, they
have also been aided by their commercial parents, even those that have
weakened. The relative safety of these ILCs in times of financial stress is
mainly due to the ILCs' commercial alliances, their access to a deep pool
of funds from their parents, and the ability of each ILC's financing arm to
function independently from its commercial parent.322 They are indepen-
dent from their parents because their operations, assets, and liabilities are
separate from their commercial parents-a separation enforced by regu-
lators. 323 But they can rely on their commercial parent in times of need
for access to capital.324 This relationship exists because of their parents'
diversified products and because each large commercial parent has a
vested interest in its bank's survival. 325 If the bank falters, the commer-
cial firm will have to pay before the federal government pays, which is
not the structure of most BHCs that do not have an independent source
of funds besides their subsidiary banks.
Perhaps the most illustrative example of the protection offered by the
ILC model in a time of financial trouble is the case of General Electric
(GE) and its ILC, GE Capital, Inc. GE has suffered significant losses in
the last several years and GE's ILC has also suffered due to defaulting
loans in its portfolio.326 GE's ILC and its parent have an income mainte-
nance agreement wherein the GE parent funnels cash to its financing arm
when it falls below a threshold.327 They injected $9.5 billion in the first
quarter of 2009 and will continue to support the ILC.3 28 The stable earn-
ings of the parent company stand behind the ILC's debt and allows the
ILC to withstand losses of assets in its portfolio. However, GE's ILC has
its own customers and independently originates loans for many small-
and medium-sized businesses. 329 GE's ILC, headquartered in Salt Lake
City, is now the forty-sixth most profitable bank in the country in spite of
GE's trouble.330 Most ILCs have similar income maintenance agree-
ments, and several have been aided by their parent companies in the last
two years during times of significant financial pressure.33 1
322. See Letter from Donald Powell, supra note 301. (Chairman, FDIC on The Future
of Banking: The Structure and Role of Commercial Affiliations, to Robert F. Bennett,
Senator, U.S. Senate (Apr. 30, 2003), available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/conferences/
future-bennett.html.)
323. See id.
324. Letter from Robert McKew, Senior Vice-President & General Counsel, American
Financial Services Association, John L. Douglas, Partner, Alston & Bird LLP, to Robert
Feldman, Executive Secretary, FDIC (Oct. 5, 2006), available at www.atsaonline.org.
325. Id.
326. Steve Lohr, G.E.'s Earnings Fall 47%, Led by Finance Unit, N.Y. TIMEs, July 18,
2009, at B3.
327. Harry Terris, Pros, Cons of Unplugging GE Capital from Its Parent, AM. BANKER,
Nov. 11, 2009, at 1.
328. Id.
329. Eric Lipton, Citing Risks, U.S. Seeks New Rules for Niche Banks, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 17, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/17/business/economy/17industrial.html.
330. Id.
331. See Letter from Donald Powell, supra note 301.
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It is not unique for a parent company to aid its subsidiary bank during
a system-wide financial crisis. The failure of thrifts in the 1980s is also
instructive in examining relationships between parent companies and
their subsidiary financial institutions. 332 During that crisis, many com-
mercial parents of thrifts were able to aid failing thrifts through capital
infusions without suffering themselves. 333 Lawrence White, a member of
the FHLBB, examined the crisis after he left office. In discussing savings-
and-loan holding companies during the crisis, White concludes, "[t]he
presence of companies involved in markets as diverse as autos, steel,
wood products, retailing, public utilities, insurance and securities as hold-
ing company owners of thrifts has not created problems; the same would
surely be true if these, or similar, companies had owned banks." 334
Commercial entities do not pose a greater risk than financial par-
ents.3 3 5 Instead of increasing systemic risk, I argue that the commercial
partnership arrangements of ILCs reduce risks within banks and the sys-
tem as a whole. If ILCs are expanded, there is always a possibility of
unforeseeable risks that do not currently exist. But if it could be proved
that the ILC created additional risks to the financial system, the question
should center on the regulators' ability to manage such risks. Sheldon
Woods, the President of the Association of Financial Services, stated that:
[I]f the FDIC and the state of Utah can't effectively manage the risk
associated with any [ILC applicant], then that is where the question
lies . . . . If that risk cannot be effectively managed, then [our] posi-
tion would be [that] we support the regulatory environment and
[ILC applications] should not be approved.336
As discussed, the risks are minimal and ILC regulators are competently
managing those risks.337
C. MOVING TO A BETTER REGULATORY APPROACH
In 2008 the Treasury proposed a "Blueprint for a Modernized Financial
Regulatory Structure" that describes the current regulatory system as an
outdated structure that needs to evolve to meet the demands of the
changing market. The fact sheet states:
332. During the thrift crisis in California in the 1980s, commercial parents of thrifts
served as an important source of capital. MUCKENFUSS & EAGER, supra note 157, at 48
n.61.
333. Id. (citing LAWRENCE J. WHITE, THE S&L DEBACLE: PUBLIC POLICY LEsSONS FOR
BANK AND THRIFr REGULATION 216 (1991)).
334. WHITE, supra note 333, at 333.
335. The FDIC analysis, concludes: "As a rule ... it likely will be difficult to generalize
about the relative riskiness of different activities for banks. In particular it is apparent that
commercial and financial activities will not be distinguishable on the basis of any inherent
differences in risk." FDIC, MANDATE FOR CHANGE, supra note 140, at 63.
336. Lloyd, supra note 94, at 242 (citing Industry Outlook: Banking & Finance, UTAH
Bus., Mar. 2007, at 67, 72).
337. "We at the FDIC must all be vigilant in our supervisory role. But I will reiterate:
The FDIC believes the ILC charter, per se, poses no greater safety and soundness risk than
other charter types." Powell Remarks, supra note 158.
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The current regulatory framework for financial institutions is based
on a structure that has been largely knit together over the past 75
years. It has evolved in an accretive way in response to problems
without any real focus on overall mission: Congress established the
national bank charter in 1863 during the Civil War, the Federal Re-
serve System in 1913 in response to various episodes of financial in-
stability, and the federal deposit insurance system during the Great
Depression. Changes were made to the regulatory structure in the
intervening years in response to other financial crises (e.g., the thrift
crises of the 1980s) or as enhancements (e.g., the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999), but for the most part the under-
lying structure resembles what existed in the 1930s....
Capital markets and the financial services industry have evolved sig-
nificantly over the past decade. Globalization and financial innova-
tion, such as securitization, have provided benefits to domestic and
global economic growth; while highlighting new risks to financial
markets....
These developments are pressuring the U.S. regulatory structure, ex-
posing regulatory gaps and redundancies, and often encouraging
market participants to do business in other jurisdictions with more
effective regulation. As a result, the U.S. regulatory structure reflects
an antiquated system struggling to keep pace with market develop-
ments while facing increasing challenges to anticipate and prevent
today's financial crises.338
The comprehensive Dodd-Frank bill, which was passed following the
public sentiments for change articulated in this pronouncement, fell short
of modernizing today's banking system. What it effected, more modestly,
was a regulatory clean-up and tinkering rather than a conceptual re-
thinking of the structure of banking. The separation of commerce and
banking is one of these outdated ideas that needs to be reexamined in
light of recent events. To operate properly, the financial regulatory struc-
ture must understand the changing nature of the banking market. The
strict separation between commerce and banking does not reflect such an
understanding. As the nature of banks and banking has changed over the
last several decades, policymakers should reconsider the separation be-
tween commerce and banking.
IV: BENEFITS OF MIXING BANKING AND COMMERCE
A. THE CURRENT FINANCIAL CRISIS
The credit crisis that has debilitated many of our nation's financial in-
stitutions has demonstrated how quickly a contagion can spread through
our nation's banks. Many banks have similar types of assets and loans,
and when one source of capital is troubled, such as collateralized debt
obligations linked to mortgage-backed securities, all of the banks experi-
338. Press Release, Fact Sheet: Blueprint for a Modernized Financial Regulatory Struc-
ture (Mar. 31, 2008), available at http://www.treas.gov/pres/releases/reports/Face-Sheet_03.
31.08.pdf.
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ence a similar loss. 3 3 9 Some institutions are more at risk than others, but
when one large institution at the center of the country's financial system
fails, it sends a ripple throughout the entire economy threatening to top-
ple all the other financial institutions from which they have borrowed
money and to whom they have served as a source of credit.3 40 Many
likened the initial banking collapse of 2008 to dominos or a house of
cards to illustrate how interconnected the financial institutions have be-
come and how prone to collapse they are when one party falters. 341 In
effect, the crisis showed that a better source of strength for a bank is an
entity whose liquidity is not dependent on the same infected financial
system, rather than a financial holding company whose instability is di-
rectly correlated with the instability of the bank.3 4 2 The current crisis has
forced the Federal Reserve and Treasury, the only sources of stable li-
quidity, to step in and provide aid and capital for troubled institutions.343
Indeed, there is a need for a more stable source of capital, or uncor-
rupted assets, to stop the domino effect. In February 2008, the invest-
ment firm Bear Stearns Companies Inc. (Bear Stearns) almost collapsed
overnight as it lost the confidence of its investors and, most importantly,
its creditors before another investment bank, JP Morgan, saved it at the
behest of the Federal Reserve.344 Because Bear Stearns operates on a
typical investment firm model of high-risk investments and short-term fi-
nancing, once the downhill slide started, it was difficult to stop or even
delay.3 4 5 Bear Stearns suffered a bank-like "run" on its assets because of
its short-term liability structure. 346 In the case of Bear Stearns, the Fed-
339. See generally Wolf Wagner, The Broadening of Activities in the Financial System:
Implications for Financial Stability and Regulation 3 (Ctr for Econ. Research, Discussion
Paper No. 2006-72) (arguing that banks have become increasingly homogenized).
340. See generally Edmund L. Andrews, Obama Has No Quick Fix for Banks, N.Y.
TIMEs, Jan. 21, 2009, at Bl.
341. News Hour (PBS television broadcast Mar. 21, 2008) (Jim Lehrer used falling
dominos to describe the fallout of the financial system); House of Cards (CNBC television
broadcast Aug. 16, 2008), available at http://www.cnbc.com/id/28892719 (CNBC used a
"House of Cards" analogy in describing the events).
342. Many of the institutions that failed or were bailed out to avert failure, such as Bear
Stearns, Lehman Brothers, Wachovia, and Washington Mutual, were either BHCs or large
investment banking institutions that experienced the same vulnerabilities as banks, such as
a "run" on their assets. AIG is an insurance company whose activities closely mirrored
those of these large banks. The banks that were most damaged had all invested heavily in
the subprime housing market. Some were over-leveraged, and their risks and vulnerabili-
ties were not diversified.
343. James Rowley & Nicholas Johnston, Bailout Bill Sent Back to House After Senate
Passage, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 2, 2008, 8:24 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=
20601087&refer=home&sid=aFnvkteaver8; Ronald D. Orol, Treasury, Fed unveil $1.5 tril-
lion rescue plan, MARKETWATCH (Feb. 10, 2009, 4:27 PM), http://www.marketwatch.com/
story/treasury-fed-unveil-15-trillion-rescue; Deborah Solomon, Market Pans Bank Rescue
Plan WALL ST. J., Feb. 11, 2009, at Al.
344. Landon Thomas Jr., JPMorgan and Fed Move to Bail Out Bear Stearns, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 14, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/14/business/14cnd-bear.html.
345. Cassidy, supra note 310, at 62.
346. Many investment banks whose activities are financial in nature and based on short-
term liabilities are structured such that they are susceptible to runs. These firms are much
like banks, but are not regulated like banks and are not supported by the FDIC. But as
seen in the recent crisis, many were bailed out by the Federal Reserve. For an analysis of
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eral Reserve was forced to step in and stabilize the firm through a capital
infusion and forced sale.3 4 7 But, perhaps this stabilizing force could have
been a commercial parent or affiliate with more stable assets and reve-
nue. As opposed to a commercial owner, a traditional BHC rarely has its
own assets and makes little to no contribution to the bank.3 4 8 Thus, hold-
ing companies have a very limited ability to save an ailing bank and are
often nothing more than bystanders when their subsidiaries are in
trouble. In fact, George Sutton testified in Congress that he could
recall only a few instances when the holding company made any dif-
ference in the fate of its subsidiary bank. In almost every case, the
holding company had no ability to rescue the failing bank and was
nothing more than a bystander. In contrast, diversified holding com-
panies can make real contributions to their bank subsidiaries. 349
An example of a typical BHC structure is Citigroup. With more than
200 subsidiaries that participate in BHC Act-sanctioned financial activi-
ties such as banking and insurance, Citigroup, the BHC parent, is a shell
that depends on the revenue of its many subsidiaries. 3 5 0 When the sub-
sidiaries are troubled, the parent cannot aid them. Thus, as the banking
industry has come under intense credit pressure, Citigroup is struggling to
keep its head above water.3 51
Commercial firms, such as Wal-Mart, on the other hand, have a diversi-
fied business plan not dependent on the revenue from a banking subsidi-
ary. Banks and retail companies operate differently. Banks have illiquid
assets (loans) and highly liquid liabilities (deposits), which make them
susceptible to runs.3 5 2 Furthermore, they are at the center of the econ-
omy's payment system and thus have constant relationships and entangle-
ments with other banks, exposing them to losses at each other's hands. It
is easy to see how a contagion, such as troubled mortgage-backed securi-
ties, can topple an entire financial system. On the other hand, retail com-
panies operate through medium- and long-term debt and are not
collateralized by assets that can lose their value quickly. Even troubled
commercial or industrial companies slide slowly into bankruptcy. In con-
trast, in September 2008, Lehman Brothers went bankrupt in a matter of
the "run" on investment banks that recently occurred, see generally Karl S. Okamoto, After
the Bailout: Regulating Systemic Moral Hazard, 57 UCLA L. REV. 183 (2009).
347. Cassidy, supra note 310, at 49.
348. Sutton Testimony, supra note 23, at 52.
349. Id. at 207.
350. Major Financial Institutions, www.swlearning.com/pdfs/chapter/0324024207_3.
PDF at 48.
351. See Eric Dash, U.S. Is Said to Agree to Raise Stakes in Citigroup, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
27, 2009, at Al.
352. The Financial Dictionary defines a bank "run" as follows: "A series of unexpected
cash withdrawals caused by a sudden decline in depositor confidence or fear that the bank
will be closed by the chartering agency, i.e. many depositors withdraw cash almost simulta-
neously. Since the cash reserve a bank keeps on hand is only a small fraction of its depos-
its, a large number of withdrawals in a short period of time can deplete available cash and
force the bank to close and possibly go out of business." FINANCIAL DicrlONARY, http://
financial-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Run+on+the+bank (last visited May 25, 2010).
1186 [Vol. 63
The ILC and the Reconstruction of U.S. Banking
days once it lost the confidence of clients and creditors. 3 5 3 The Federal
Reserve could not stop this giant firm from falling, and some claim that
the fall of Lehman Brothers was the straw that broke the back of our
financial system-in a matter of days.3 5 4 On the other hand, the U.S.
automakers have grappled with financial difficulties for years and are
close to, or have already declared, bankruptcy.3 5 5 However, they have
assets of significant value, and their distress has not had the tremendously
damaging effect on U.S. and world markets that Lehman Brothers' col-
lapse caused.
Commercial companies can encounter problems, but these are largely
unrelated to the problems of the financial community, though commer-
cial companies can be affected when the financial system is damaged.35 6
The assets of Ford Motor Company, for example, will not disappear as
quickly as those of Lehman Brothers or Bear Steams did. Ford will not
suffer a "run" on its assets. They have and will struggle to balance their
assets with their liabilities for months or years without a sudden unex-
pected collapse. Wal-Mart, for example, reported an annual revenue of
$404 billion dollars for 2009.357 A healthy firm, such as Wal-Mart, on
even a troubled automaker, can serve as a stable source of capital when a
sudden collapse has shaken a financial system. As the recent crisis dem-
onstrates, government regulation and oversight does not ensure safety,35
but a stable source of capital always will. A commercial firm is still vul-
nerable to systemic shocks, but diversifying the sources of capital in a
financial system can lower the risks most banks and investment firms face
when the market suddenly sours.
With the nation's banks on the brink, the federal government has
served as a stopgap to prevent (or delay) collapse. There is another solu-
tion. Stable commercial entities can step in to stop the hemorrhaging of
our nation's banks. In the short term, failing banks can be converted into
ILCs and sold to commercial firms who can revive them, thereby avoid-
ing bank liquidations or expensive government intervention. 35 9 In the
353. Cassidy, supra note 311, at 49.
354. James Surowiecki, Hazardous Materials?, THE NEW YORKER, Feb. 9, 2009, at 40.
355. Bill Vlasic & Nick Bunkley, Automakers Fear a New Normal of Low Sales, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 6, 2009 at Bl; Jim Rutenberg & Bill Vlasic, Chrysler Files for Bankruptcy;
UAW and Fiat to take Control, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2009, at Al.
356. See Stephanie Rosenbloom, Sales Fall Sharply for Retailers Not Named Wal-Mart,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2009, at B3.
357. Wal-Mart, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wikilWal-Mart (last visited Aug. 10,
2010).
358. There is a lot of finger pointing among policymakers as to which regulator is to
blame. The Federal Reserve has blamed the SEC's inadequate governing of the major
investment banks through their Consolidated Supervised Entities (CSE) program, and the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) and FDIC have also been blamed. See
John Sandman, CSE Program A Failed Experiment, SEC. TECH. MONITOR, Jan. 19, 2009, at
4. Unfortunately, as we have seen in the past, lawmakers will most likely respond to the
crisis with added regulation that may increase oversight or activities restrictions, but will
also likely miss the mark.
359. The FDIC has already shown a desire and willingness to allow private non-BHC
investors to buy and help aid failing banks. In August of 2009, the FDIC launched a pro-
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long-term, policymakers should use the successful ILC model as a guide
as they begin to reshape banking in the following months and years.360
With respect to ILCs, most of their holding companies are many times
larger than their ILC subsidiaries and could rescue their ILCs from even
catastrophic losses that would otherwise debilitate a freestanding bank.
"Nothing in the Federal Reserve's array of powers can protect against a
bank's failure better than a capital maintenance agreement with a diversi-
fied parent" of a banking subsidiary.361 The ILC model has demon-
strated how a commercial firm can serve as a backup source of liquidity
to prevent a bank from collapsing. When ILCs encounter problems, their
large commercial parents can infuse capital into the banks in a matter of
hours, thereby stabilizing them and allowing them to function through a
threatening credit shortage that would debilitate an unaffiliated commer-
cial bank.3 62
A practical criticism for allowing more integration between commerce
and banking is that while Wal-Mart and other commercial firms may
know about the retail or auto business, their market dominance and supe-
riority does not encompass banking.363 In other words, Wal-Mart is good
at retail, but what does it know about banking? This criticism assumes
that the same people that run the retail operation would also run the
bank. However, that management structure is impermissible under state
charter restrictions. 364 Utah, for example, requires that the management
executives of all ILCs have extensive bank management experience.365
The state charter also requires that the board of directors be comprised of
a majority of independent members.366 Al D. Melina, for example, was a
top executive at Bank of America, a BHC, for over twenty years before
he began managing GMAC's ILC.3 6 7 BMW's ILC chairman has been in
gram to invite private equity firms to buy and control banks without being subject to BHC
Act restrictions. See FDIC, FINAL STATEMENT OF POLICY ON QUALIFICATIONS FOR
FAILED BANK AcQuIsrnoNs (2009), available at www.fdic.gov/news/board/Aug26no2.pdf;
see also Carl Gutierrez, FDIC Gives Private Equity a Break, FORBEs (Aug. 26, 2009 6:30
PM), http://www.forbes.com/2009/08/26/fdic-bair-banking-markets-equities-private-
equity.html.
360. Ben Bernanke, in an address to Chicago Federal Reserve, said, "Looking forward,
the Federal Reserve, other regulators, and the Congress must evaluate what we have
learned from the recent [sub-prime mortgage crisis] and decide what additional regulation
or oversight may be needed to prevent a recurrence." Ben Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Re-
serve, Special Address at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago 43rd Annual Conference
on Bank Structure and Competition: Subprime Mortgage Market 5 (May 2007) (on file
with author).
361. Sutton Testimony, supra note 23, at 207.
362. George Sutton gave an example of Morgan Stanley's ILC asking for and receiving
a $130 million dollar capital infusion overnight. Telephone Interview with George Sutton
(Jan. 7, 2009).
363. See ICBA Testimony, supra note 176.
364. These requirements are outlined in Utah's Department of Financial Institutions
website at www.dfi.utah.gov/Finlnst.htm.
365. Id.
366. Id.
367. Telephone Interview with Darryle Rude, supra note 316.
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the banking industry for over twenty-five years.368 For many of the com-
panies that own ILCs, including GMAC, BMW, Ford, and Target, lending
is not a new business. Target launched the first in-store credit card over
one hundred years ago in their Dayton Hudson store and has operated
Target National Bank, which was grandfathered in through CEBA, for
over fifteen years.369
A potential risk in expanding the ILC model would be that the ILC
subsidiary would become a larger entity than the commercial firm above
it and control the business such that the commercial firm could not serve
as a backup source of liquidity for the bank. This structure would resem-
ble a typical bank holding company, but with the added risk that the
FDIC would be forced to step in and bail out the commercial parent.
However, this structure can be impeded by regulation, and it does not
pose more of a risk to the banking system than the current BHC
structure.
B. ECONOMIc BENEFITS
In addition to a general stabilizing effect, studies have shown that there
are also benefits to the broader economy when banking and commerce
are allowed to mix. 3 70 Bank diversification reduces operating costs and
can result in more efficient management of different financial transac-
tions.3 71 Achieving a lower cost of production by increasing the scale of
production is referred to as economies of scale. 3 7 2 Reducing costs by co-
ordinating various products within one organization is referred to as
economies of scope.373 Thomas Huertas states:
Financial services are particularly likely to be characterized by econ-
omies of scope, for information is a key factor in the production of
financial services.. . . For example, many of the same data needed to
grant a mortgage can be used to sell homeowner's insurance. The
firm that offers both services need collect the information only once
and can pass the resultant cost savings along to the consumer.374
Huertas argues that the mixing of banking and commerce would elimi-
nate the market power that our current financial system confers on finan-
368. Id.
369. Id.
370. See, e.g., Huertas, supra note 1, at 743-62; FDIC, MANDATE FOR CHANGE, supra
note 140, at 283.
371. See generally, FDIC, MANDATE FOR CHANGE, supra note 140, at 2; Raskovich,
supra note 44; Huertas, supra note 1.
372. See Economies of Scale Definition, THE LINUX INFORMATION PROJEcr, http://
www.linfo.org/economies-of Scale.html (last visited July 22, 2010).
373. Economies of scope arise when a factor needed to produce one product can be
used at little or no additional cost to produce another. This means that a firm that pro-
duces the two products jointly can do so more cheaply than two independent firms that
produce the two products separately. Customers therefore get a lower price on one or
both of the two products, and firms that produce the products jointly tend to gain market
share at the expense of firms that produce the products separately. Huertas, supra note 1,
at 746-47.
374. Huertas, supra note 1, at 747.
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cial firms and that the increased competition would allow financial firms
to develop more comprehensive financial services that would result in
improved convenience and reduced prices. 375 He also demonstrates that
limits on entry into any sector increases transaction costs and service
fees.376
A relevant study analyzed the success of banks that entered a market
through a Wal-Mart store compared with banks that entered a market in
other ways.377 The study found that banks located within Wal-Mart
stores, though not owned by Wal-Mart, experience more rapid growth in
deposits.378 This study suggests that the "one-stop shopping" approach to
banking could lead to increased market efficiencies.
Another study used corporate tax returns to conclude that bank hold-
ing companies could double their average return on assets, without any
increase in risk, by investing in the following diversified portfolio: "55%
asset value in banking, 14% in retail, 13% in non-bank financial services,
8% in wholesale, and 6% in construction." 3 79 The study concludes that
increasing returns could have been accomplished with minimum risk by
combining banks with one of the construction, retail, or wholesale sectors
and that the potential benefits from banking diversification appear to be
quite significant. 380
Although the United States is one of the most restrictive banking re-
gimes in the world and has limited data on the effects of mixing banking
and commerce, studies done abroad clearly demonstrate the economic
benefits of this mixture.381 In the United Kingdom (UK) and the EU, for
example, most commercial firms, including United States firms, own
banks because there is no prohibition against a commercial firm owning a
bank. 3 82 The EU defines a bank widely as "an institution that grants
credit for its own account and receives deposits . . . from the public, and
has a banking license .... "383
375. Id.
376. "[L]imits on entry into investment banking tend to raise the underwriting fees that
issuers must pay to float new securities." Id. at 746.
377. ROBERT M. ADAMS ET AL., The Value of Location in Bank Competition: Examin-
ing the Effect of Wal-Mart Branches, in THE MIXING OF BANKING & COMMERCE, supra
note 157, at 84, 84 (demonstrating that Wal-Mart bank branches are a complement to and
are benefited by relationship to Wal-Mart and that it is the existing distribution channel
that makes the in-store locations valuable).
378. Id. at 88.
379. Id. (citing Larry D. Wall et al., The Last Frontier: The Integration of Banking and
Commerce in the U.S. 49 (May 2007) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Financial
Management Association International)); Raskovich, supra note 44, at 9.
380. Wall et al., supra note 379, at 22, 39.
381. See generally Barth et al., supra note 174; Joio A.C. Santos, Banking and Com-
merce: How Does the United States Compare to Other Countries?, 34 FED. RES. BANK OF
CLEVELAND ECON. REV. 14, 18-23 (1997).
382. HUERTAS, supra note 256, at 64. The examples include GE and GE Credit, which
own various banks in several member states; Ford Motor and Ford Motor Credit, which
owns Ford Credit Europe Bank (UK); E-Bay/PayPal, which owns PayPal Bank (Luxem-
bourg); Volkswagen, VW Bank (Germany); and Sainsbury, which own Sainsbury's Bank
(UK).
383. Id. at 61.
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Although many of these studies were conducted before the current fi-
nancial crisis, which has largely reshaped banking, their findings are still
persuasive. A number of studies conducted on banks in Japan and Ger-
many indicate that where commerce and banking are not separated, in-
formational efficiencies lead to reduced transaction costs in doing
business. 384 A few studies have shown that distressed commercial firms
with banking affiliates have performed better and overcome insolvency
sooner than those without affiliations, resulting in lower financial distress
for the firm as well as lower costs.38 Studies conducted in the United
States have found that firms affiliated with banks perform better during
reconstruction following bankruptcy than unaffiliated firms.3 8 6 And
other studies have shown the positive effects of bankers being on the
boards of commercial firms.3 87
When banks and commercial firms have a close relationship, there is a
better assessment of risk. In Germany, firms held by banks performed
better than those not affiliated with banks.388 In the U.S. system, where
banks are not allowed to affiliate with commercial firms, a problem of
"asymmetric information" arises, which can result in increased expenses.
A recent study examining the effect of informational asymmetries on the
pricing and maturity of private debt contracts found that information
asymmetries increase the costs of debt capital and decrease loan maturi-
ties in both private and public markets.389 Banks must engage in a time-
consuming and costly due diligence process to gather information on bor-
rowers before issuing credit. While this process is useful and necessary,
any reduction in these expenses would lower the cost of capital. Studies
have shown that in countries where commercial entities and banks are
more integrated, higher levels of information sharing has led to lower
costs of capital and transaction costs. 3 9 0
A recent cross-country study looked at how the mixing of banking and
commerce would affect loan pricing and found that integration could lead
to better loan terms because of stronger lender-borrower relationships
and informational advantages that could lead to more efficient monitor-
ing.391 Another study determined that "small business borrowers with
longer banking relationships tend to pay lower interest rates and are less
384. Haubrich & Santos, supra note 3, at 123.
385. See Santos, supra note 381, at 23.
386. Barth et al., supra note 174, at 1210-11.
387. Joho A.C. Santos & Adrienne S. Rumble, The American Keiretsu and Universal
Banks: Investing, Voting and Sitting on Nonfinancials' Corporate Boards, 80 J. FIN. EcoN.
419, 422 (2006).
388. Haubrich & Santos, supra note 3, at 123.
389. REGINA WITTENBERG-MOERMAN, The Impact of Information Asymmetry on Debt
Pricing and Maturity Presentation, in THE MIXING OF BANKING & COMMERCE, supra note
157, at 123, 135.
390. Raskovich, supra note 44, at 12.
391. Li Hao et al., Effect of Bank Regulation and Lender Location on Loan Spreads
(Working Paper 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=775027.
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likely to pledge collateral," 3 9 2 further demonstrating that informational
efficiencies lead to reduced transaction costs. When banks have access to
more information, they can more accurately price for risk and pass on a
lower interest rate to the borrower.393 Through an ongoing lending rela-
tionship, a bank can obtain more accurate information about a firm's
credit risk. In turn, this can lead to a better valuation of a firm and limit
over pricing or underpricing, which is damaging to capital markets. A
2004 study found that "under-pricing is [about 17%] less severe for IPOs
managed by banks that have a pre-IPO relationship with the firm going
public."394
A comprehensive study conducted on banks across the world found no
positive effects "from restricting the mixing of banking and com-
merce." 395 In fact, the study found that "restricting the mixing of banking
and commerce is associated with greater financial fragility." 396 The "em-
pirical results highlight the negative implications of imposing restrictions
on the activities of commercial banks" and found "no countervailing posi-
tive benefits from restricting the mixing of banking and commerce." 397
It is problematic to apply international studies to the United States'
financial system because the United States' banking system is much
larger and more complex than other financial systems, but the studies do
show that where commerce and banking have mixed, the results have
been positive.398 In addition, many of these findings have been weak-
ened as banks across the world, including those that were diversified, are
now in severe distress.
Thomas Huertas, advocating the mixing of banking and commerce in
the United States, states that "technology and market developments are
blurring the distinction between banks and non-banks." 399 Huertas ar-
gues that the American system needs to catch up to the advances in the
financial markets. 400 Many commercial firms in America already partici-
pate in banking activities through commercial paper and private place-
ments. Many sources of credit and investments in commercial firms are
392. Raskovich, supra note 44, at 13; Allen N. Berger & Gregory F. Udell, Relationship
Lending and Lines of Credit in Small Firm Finance, 68 J. Bus. 351, 353 (1995).
393. Berger & Udell, supra note 392, at 363.
394. Raskovich, supra note 44, at 14; Carola Schenone, The Effect of Banking Relation-
ships on the Firm's IPO Underpricing, 59 J. FIN. 2903, 2905 (2004).
395. JAMEs R. BARTH ET AL., Banking Systems Around the Globe: Do Regulation and
Ownership Affect Performance and Stability?, in PRUDENTIAL SUPERVISION: WHAT WORKS
AND WHAT DOESN'T 31, 35 (Frederic S. Mishkin ed., 2001).
396. Id. at 10.
397. Id. at 3, 11.
398. See supra notes 381-90 and accompanying text.
399. Darwish & Evanoff, supra note 273, at 3. In 1997, Chairman Greenspan addressed
such developments as follows: "The world is changing rapidly and it may well become
increasingly difficult to distinguish between banking and aspects of commerce." The Finan-
cial Services Competitiveness Act of 1997: Hearing on H.R. 10 Before the H. Comm. on
Banking and Financial Servs., 105th Cong. 5 (1997) (statement of Alan Greenspan, Chair-
man of the Federal Reserve).
400. Huertas, supra note 382, at 61.
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essentially identical to banking activities.4 0 1 PayPal Inc., for example, is a
commercial enterprise that has over one hundred million consumers and
firms in over fifty countries. 4 0 2 PayPal issues accounts that "enable [a]
holder to send and receive payments, hold balances (that may be invested
in a money market mutual fund) and withdraw cash from ATMs." 403
"Mobile-phone companies issue pre-paid cards that [customers can use]
to pay for telecom's services and, increasingly, offer other goods and ser-
vices as well." 4 0 4 Other businesses that previously did not intersect with
banking have now developed financing arms in order to better serve cus-
tomers and expand their reach. One example is UPS Capital, which pro-
vides financing for small businesses developing their supply chain. 405
UPS is just one example of a company that has found greater efficiency
and an increased capacity to meet customer demand by engaging in bank-
ing activities. Thus, commercial firms are already engaged in offering
credit and accepting deposits-activities that were previously the domain
of commercial banks. And they are doing so because the global market
seems to demand and reward more comprehensive business solutions and
services.406
Just as businesses are increasing efficiency by providing financing, re-
search has also demonstrated that when banks are integrated and their
operations diversified, they are less likely to take risks.407 One study of
the benefits of mixing and commerce concludes that "permit[ing] vertical
integration between banks and commercial firms . . . would tend to raise
bank profits while advancing economic efficiency by improving coordina-
tion between banks and commercial borrowers." 4 0 8 It is unlikely that risk
can be eliminated from banking, and it is possible that commercial firms
entering banking would introduce new and unforeseen risks as these part-
nerships were allowed to expand. Nevertheless, there is a body of re-
search that seems to support the proposition that allowing commercial
firm ownership of ILCs could lead to increased stability and efficiency.409
For the last several decades, ILCs with commercial parents have been a
small, controlled arena to test the effects of mixing banking and com-
401. Id. at 62.
402. Id.
403. Id. Huertas notes that cash withdrawals at ATMs are only allowed at certain
locations.
404. Id.
405. FRIEDMAN, supra note 266, at 173 ("UPS was doing business with a small biotech
company in Canada ... [that was having a] problem keeping up with demand and could
not get financing. . . . UPS redesigned the company's system based around a refrigerator
hub in Dallas and extended it financing through UPS Capital. The result . . . was less
inventory, better cash flow, better customer service-and an embedded customer for
UPS.").
406. Id. at 149-50. Thomas Friedman explains how "insourcing" and outsourcing have
caused many companies to service clients on several levels. Id. He focuses on UPS's fi-
nancing arm to demonstrate how this company is expanding its services to take more com-
panies from small to global enterprises. Id.
407. Id. at 4-6.
408. Raskovich, supra note 44, at 11.
409. See supra notes 370-87 and accompanying text.
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merce, and they have proven safe. When analyzing the S&L debacle of
the 1980s, a banking scholar noted: "[T]hese facts, at a minimum, support
the conclusion that any correlation between 'commercial' control of a
bank and safety-and-soundness is strongly positive." 410 The ILC sector
has also demonstrated this point. Problems at commercial-affiliated insti-
tutions have been very rare, and the FDIC fund has not borne losses.411
C. UTAH ILCs
Utah, home to most of the nation's ILCs, has been an effective regula-
tor, and the many ILCs thriving in the state have shown that commerce
and banking can indeed mix with positive results and without heightened
risk. William M. Isaac, the former chairman of the FDIC, speaking on
ILCs stated that "those who would restrict its operation should bear a
significant burden of demonstrating the need for the restrictions ....
Putting the Wal-Mart issue aside, there is not a thing wrong with the ILC
industry or its regulation." 4 12
As mentioned previously, no commercially owned ILC failure has
caused a single dollar of loss to the FDIC insurance fund, and no Utah-
based ILC (commercial or not) has ever failed. 413 Moreover, an FDIC
study states that there are three variables affecting the probability of in-
solvency: the level of the capital-asset ratio, the level of returns, and the
variability of returns.414 The higher the capital-asset ratio and the level of
returns; on average, the lower the probability of failure is.415 Utah ILCs
rank higher on all of these levels, on average, compared to most other
states. 416 An analysis of banking figures released September 30, 2008, for
state-chartered banks across the United States demonstrates that ILCs
have higher capital-asset ratios and lower risk than most other state-
chartered banks.417 Thus, Utah ILCs are among the healthiest banks in
the country. Although several of the twenty-seven Utah ILCs lost money
in 2008 and 2009, they remain well-capitalized overall and have good as-
set quality.418
In addition to being well-capitalized and well-managed, the ILC indus-
try makes important contributions to consumers with very minimal
410. MUCKENFUSS & EAGER, supra note 157, at 46.
411. See supra notes 381-402 and accompanying text.
412. William M. Isaac, Wal-Mart Issue No Reason to Hobble ILC Industry, AM.
BANKER, Mar. 13, 2007, at 1.
413. Leary Testimony, supra note 19, at 7.
414. See FDIC, MANDATE FOR CHANGE, supra note 140, at 61.
415. Id.
416. 1 compare the capital ratios of Utah to other states for third quarter 2008. Eighty
percent of Utah's state-chartered banks are ILCs, so the Utah statistics are a good indica-
tor for the entire ILC industry. State figures are available at FDIC State Profiles 2008,
FDIC, http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/stateprofile/index.html (last visited July 24,
2010).
417. Id.
418. Telephone Interview with Darryle Rude, supra note 316.
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risk.419 In the history of ILCs, only two ILCs with parent companies have
failed, and their parent companies were not commercial firms but finan-
cial corporations. 420 It is noteworthy that these holding companies were
financial companies and not commercial firms. These two failures cost
the FDIC about $100 million and as John Douglas observes:
Both failed not as a result of any self dealing, conflicts of interest or
impropriety by their corporate owners; rather, they failed the "old
fashioned way"-poor risk diversification, imprudent lending and
poor controls. These two failures stand in sharp contrast to the hun-
dreds of bank failures that operated in holding company structures,
many of which cost the FDIC billions of dollars.421
The strength of Utah ILCs has to do with its sophisticated regulatory
scheme and the diverse holding companies that own Utah ILCs. The reg-
ulatory organizations have responded to potential failures on a number of
occasions and helped ailing firms. 4 2 2 It is the nature of ILCs that causes
their success-they can receive capital very quickly, literally overnight,
from their well-funded parents when they encounter problems. This easy
access to capital cannot be understated, as it is the most important factor
for bank safety. An ILC also benefits from its business relationship with
the parent. There are no marketing costs associated with ILCs because
their business is often handed to them from their parent company. Most
parents organize industrial banks to add value to an existing business, and
as a result, the banks begin as profitable enterprises with few start-up
costs and pitfalls. 423 Most traditional banks only achieve this level of se-
curity and development after many years in operation.
V. CONCLUSION
On February 25, 2009, President Obama, addressing the financial regu-
latory system, stated, "we can no longer sustain . .. 21st century markets
419. See generally ILCs-A Review of Charter, Ownership, and Supervision Issues,
supra note 30, at 55 (testimony of John L. Douglas on behalf of the American Financial
Services Association (AFSA).
420. The two institutions were Pacific Thrift and Loan and Security Pacific Bank. See
Press Release, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., FDIC Approves the Assumption of the Insured
Deposits of Pacific Thrift and Loan Company, Woodland Hills, California (Nov. 19, 1999),
available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/1999/pr9971.html); Press Release, Fed.
Deposit Ins. Corp., Pacific Western Bank Acquires All the Deposits of Security Pacific
Bank, Los Angeles, California, (Nov. 7, 2008), available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/
press/2008/pr08114.html; see also ILCs-A Review of Charter, Ownership, and Supervision
Issues, supra note 307, at 100 n.20. Between 1986 and 1996, there were a series of ILC
failures, due to the California banking crisis. None of the failed banks had a commercial
parent nor were they part of a larger holding company structure. According to the FDIC,
they failed from "ineffective risk management and poor credit quality." Id.; see also West,
supra note 9, at 6.
421. ILCs-A Review of Charter, Ownership, and Supervision Issues, supra note 307, at
100 (testimony of John L. Douglas on behalf of the American Financial services
Association).
422. Telephone Interview with Darryle Rude, supra note 316.
423. Sutton Testimony, supra note 23, at 52.
2010]1 1195
SMU LAW REVIEW
with 20th century regulations."4 2 4 Policymakers should reconsider regu-
lation that bans the relationship between commerce and banking and
should usher in a more open financial system through a new regulatory
structure that acknowledges the advances of the last several decades.
Such openness between banking and commerce will require a new system
of comprehensive oversight, which can be modeled after the successful
ILC regulatory structure.
The ILC has filled a much-needed role in the intersection between
banking and commerce for many years and has met the market's demand
for flexibility in banking. In addition, the current economic crisis has il-
lustrated the danger of a non-diversified banking system. The ILC struc-
ture is currently the only place where the stabilizing relationship between
commerce and banking takes place and, as demonstrated, the small in-
dustry has remained sound through a systemic financial collapse largely
due to its commercial relationships.
424. Caren Bohan & Jeff Mason, Obama urges quick action on Wall Street reform, USA
TODAY (Feb. 27, 2009, 1:08 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/money/companies/regulation/
2009-02-25-obama-wall-street-reformsN.htm.
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